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National security is a pillar of international law. As long as
sovereign states exert power within the international legal
regime, national security will be an exception to international
law. These security concerns also come to light in the
international investment legal regime. The international
investment legal regime provides for essential security exceptions,
aiming at protecting host states' interests. This practice has been
honored by international investment treaties and international
investment ribunals. Although such exemption provisions can
balance the interests between international investors and host
states, they might be abused by host states in virtue of rising
protectionism.
Today, with respect to international investment, worldwide
protectionism is rising under the guise of national security. Can
domestic courts or international tribunals examine the process of
national security review conducted under a relevant national
committee? If yes, how should domestic courts or international
tribunals evaluate the process of national security review? If no,
what are the alternatives to prevent the abuse of application of
national security grounds? In the international investment legal
regime, the issue of how to balance essential security interests and
foreign investors' interests has not been resolved until now.
Aiming to fill this gap, this Article answers those questions with
a comprehensive study of how to deal with national security
issues in different phases of international investment.
This Article makes three contributions. First, it
distinguishes national security issues in the pre -establishment
phase and the post-establishment phase. Moreover, it
distinguishes non-self-judging essential security clauses and self-
judging essential security clauses in international investment
agreements. Building upon these differences, this Article provides
* C.V. Starr Lecturer at Peking University School of Transnational Law. Affiliated
Fellow of Information Society Project, Yale Law School. LL.M., Yale Law School. I am
grateful to Mark Feldman, David Grewal, Samuel Moyn, Michael Reisman, Susan Rose-
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different methodologies to deal with national security review.
Second, rejecting the popular "good faith" methodology to review
national security decisions by international tribunals, this
Article provides an alternative to deal with national security
issues involving foreign investment-a model of compensation.
Third, this Article offers some thoughts on how adjudicators and
policy makers should think about national security in
international investment law.
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1. INTRODUCTION
International investment agreements (IIAs) aim to protect and
promote foreign investment by setting obligations for the host states.
Investor-state arbitration has formed a part of the international
investment legal regime for more than forty years. The first reported
arbitral award was issued just twenty-nine years ago. 1 Today
international investment has become the most important vehicle to
bring goods and services to foreign markets,
2 and IIAs have grown
considerably over the last decade. 3 According to the 2017 World
Investment Report, thirty-seven new international investment
agreements were concluded in 2016, resulting in 3,324 international
investment agreements in total.4 Sixty-two new investor-state dispute
settlement cases were filed in 2016, resulting in 767 known IIA claims
in total.5 This fast development has generated serious systemic and
legitimacy challenges.6
Foreign investment flowing into host states generally goes
through two phases-the pre-establishment phase and the post-
establishment phase. 7 Both phases potentially involve essential
1. Asian Agric. Prods. Ltd. v. Republic of Sri Lanka, ICSID Case No. ARB/87/3,
Final Award, T 116 (June 27, 1990), 6 ICSID Rev. 526 (1997).
2. KARL P. SAUVANT, THE INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW AND POLICY
REGIME: CHALLENGES AND OPTIONS ii (Int'l Ctr. for Trade & Sustainable Dev. & World
Econ. Forum eds., 2015).
3. See U.N. CONFERENCE ON TRADE & DEV., WORLD INVESTMENT REPORT 2017:
INVESTMENT AND THE DIGITAL ECONOMY, at 111, U.N. Sales No. E.17.II.D.3 (2017).
4. Id.
5. Id. at 114.
6. Jiurgen Kurtz, The Use and Abuse of WTO Law in Investor-State Arbitration:
Competition and its Discontents, 20 EUR. J. INT'L L. 749, 750 (2009).
7. The line between the pre-establishment and the post-establishment phase is
whether there is so-called investment in international investment law. If investment has
not existed, then the period is within pre-establishment phase. If there is investment,
then the period is within post-establishment phase. There are different approaches to
define "investment" in international investment agreements. See Salini Costruttori
S.p.A. & Italstrade S.p.A. v. Morocco, ICSID Case No. ARB/00/4, Decision on
Jurisdiction, 1 52 (July 23, 2009) [hereinafter Salinil ("The doctrine generally considers
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security issues. IIAs can grant rights to protected foreign investors
only after they have been allowed into the territorial jurisdiction of the
state.8 When a bilateral investment treaty (BIT) is limited to the post-
establishment phase, the host country retains the right to set specific
entry requirements for foreign investors.9 National legislation may
provide discriminatory rules in relation to the admission of foreign
investments.1 0 Once they are admitted, however, foreign investments
may not be subjected to discrimination, regardless of their country of
origin."
HAs may also grant rights to protected foreign investors after the
admission or establishment of investment. With the emergence of
investment chapters in free trade agreements (FTAs) in the 1990s, an
increasing number of HAs have granted rights to foreign investors
after the admission phase to liberalize capital movement. 12 The North
American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) Article 1103 started this
that investment infers: contributions, a certain duration of performance of the contract
and a participation in the risks of the transaction. In reading the Convention's preamble,
one may add the contribution to the economic development of the host State of the
investment as an additional condition."; see also W. Michael Reisman & Anna Vinnik,
What Constitutes an Investment and Who Decides?, in 4 CONTEMPORARY ISSUES IN
INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION AND MEDIATION: THE FORDHAM PAPERS 50, 70 (Arthur W.
Rovine ed., Brill 2011). Michael Reisman and Anna Vinnik propose the "subjective
approach" to define "investment" in BITs, that is, leaving the definition of "investment"
to the parties. The "subjective approach" serves the object and purpose of ICSID since
ICSID is a service provider whose function is to make available an arbitral option. See
also Philip Morris v. Oriental Republic of Uru., ICSID Case No. ARB/10/7, Decision on
Jurisdiction, ¶¶ 197, 199 (July 2, 2013) (A further aspect to be considered when
interpreting the term "investment" under Article 25(1) of the ICSID Convention is its
interplay with the definition of "investment" under the BIT. The consent of the
Contracting Parties under the BIT to the scope of "investment" is of relevance when
establishing the meaning of the term under Article 25(1) of the ICSID Convention,
although such Parties do not have an unfettered discretion to go beyond what have been
called the "outer limits" set by the ICSID Convention.).
8. See Agreement for the Promotion and Protection of Investments, U.K.-
Mozam., art. 4, Mar. 18, 2004 [hereinafter United Kingdom-Mozambique BIT] ("Neither
Contracting Party shall in its Territory subject Nationals or Companies of the other
Contracting Party, as regards their management, maintenance, use, enjoyment or
disposal of their Investments, to treatment less favourable than that which it accords to
its own Nationals or Companies or to nationals or companies of any third State.").
9. See M. SORNARAJAN, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW ON FOREIGN INVESTMENT 97-
115 (3d ed., Cambridge Univ. Press 2004).
10. See id. at 137.
11. See 2012 U.S. Model Bilateral Investment Treaty (BIT), arts. 3-4, Apr. 20,
2012, https://ustr.gov/sites/default/files/BIT%2text%20for%20ACIEP%20Meeting.pdf
[https://perma.cc/2TCN-H6WA] (archived Sept. 3, 2019).
12. SORNARAJAN, supra note 9.
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trend, 13 followed by its respective model BITs. 14 The EU-Canada
Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA) and the
China-Australia FTA made the same arrangement.1 5 Upon extending
BIT benefits to the pre-establishment phase, host states waive any
discriminatory measure on the admission of foreign investment, and
they also waive their right to take new discriminatory measures in the
future.16 Extending the scope of BITs to the pre-establishment phase
is an important limitation of state sovereignty.
The international investment legal regime provides for essential
security exceptions, aiming at protecting host states' interests.'
7 This
practice has been honored by international investment treaties and
international investment tribunals. is With respect to sovereignty
concerns regarding national security, international investment
treaties provide two categories of essential security clauses. The first
one is the non-self-judging clause, such as United States-Argentina
13. See North American Free Trade Agreement, U.S.-Can.-Mex., art. 1103, Dec.
17, 1992 [hereinafter NAFTA] ("Each Party shall accord to investors of another Party
treatment no less favorable than that it accords, in like circumstances, to investors of
any other Party or of a non-Party with respect to the establishment, acquisition,
expansion, management, conduct, operation, and sale or other disposition of
investments.").
14. See 2012 U.S. Model Bilateral Investment Agreement, supra note 11, art. 4;
Canadian Model Foreign Investment Protection Agreement, art. 4, Aug. 2004
[hereinafter FIPA].
15. See EU-Canada Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement, Can.-Eur.,
art. 8.7.1, Oct. 30, 2016 [hereinafter CETA]; see also Free Trade Agreement, Austl.-
China, arts. 9.3.1, 9.4.1, June 17, 2015 [hereinafter Australia-China FTA] ("Each Party
shall accord to investors of the other Party, and covered investments, in relation to the
establishment, acquisition, expansion, management, conduct, operation, and sale or
other disposition of investments in its territory, treatment no less favourable than that
it accords, in like circumstances, to investors and investments in its territory of investors
of any non-Party.").
16. U.N. CONFERENCE ON TRADE& DEV., NATIONAL TREATMENT, at 10, U.N. Doc.
UNCTAD/ITE/IIT/11, U.N. Sales No. E.99.11.D.16 (1999) [hereinafter UNCTAD I].
17. Here, the author uses "essential security" in international investment
interchangeably with "national security." See CETA, supra note 15. The title of Article
28.6 is "national security," but the scope of essential security is smaller than that of
national security. And essential security is part of national security.
18. See Argentina-United States: Treaty Concerning the Reciprocal
Encouragement and Protection of Investment, Arg.-U.S., art. XI, Nov. 14, 1991, 31 I.L.M.
124 (1992) [hereinafter U.S.-Argentina BIT] ("This Treaty shall not preclude the
application by either Party of measures necessary for the maintenance of public order,
the fulfillment of its obligations with respect to the maintenance or restoration of
international peace or security, or the Protection of its own essential security interests.");
see also United States-Uruguay: Treaty Concerning the Encouragement and Reciprocal
Protection of Investment, U.S.-Uru., art. 18, Nov. 4, 2005 ("nothing in the Treaty may be
construed to preclude a Party from applying measures that it considers necessary either
to protect its own essential security interests or to fulfill its obligations with respect to
the maintenance or restoration of international peace and security."); CETA, supra note
15, at art. 28.6(b) ("Nothing in this Agreement shall be construed to prevent a Party from
taking an action that it considers necessary to protect its essential security interests.").
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BIT Article XI.19 This kind of clause does not clearly specify that state
parties have full competence to assess the necessity of the measures
related to essential security.20 The other category is the self-judging
clause, such as Article 18 of the U.S. Model BIT.21 This kind of clause
empowers the parties of the agreements to fully judge the necessity of
the measures taken to protect their essential security interests. The
difference between these two categories of clauses is that the latter
contains the phrase "it considers necessary," while the former only
contains "necessary." By means of the latter clause, states reserve the
right to unilaterally declare such obligations to be nonbinding if the
state in question determines that its essential interests are at stake.
Although such exemption provisions can balance the interests between
international investors and host states, they might be abused by host
states due to rising protectionism. Can domestic courts or international
tribunals examine the process of national security review? If yes, how
should domestic courts or international tribunals evaluate the process
of national security review? If no, what are the alternatives to prevent
the abuse of application of national security exceptions?
The overarching objective of this Article is to set out a framework
for the study of these aforementioned questions and offer some
thoughts on how they might be used to guide adjudicators in dealing
with national security issues in the international investment arena.
With respect to non-self-judging essential security clauses, this Article
asserts that the investment tribunals have the competence to review
them, and the "reasonable available" approach is a better approach
than the "only way" approach in reviewing non-self-judging essential
security clauses. With respect to self-judging essential security clauses,
this Article rejects the traditional "good faith" approach in reviewing
self-judging essential security clauses. Instead, this Article offers an
alternative option, that is, compensation should be paid for the loss
from essential security measures, including the specific reasons for
compensation.
This topic is timely and important. From the beginning of the
international investment legal regime, to the economic crisis in
Argentina, to worldwide protectionism today, legal scholars have not
comprehensively explored how to deal with national security in
19. U.S.-Argentina BIT, supra note 18, at art. XI.
20. Robyn Briese & Stephan Schill, '7f the State Considers": Self-Judging Clauses
in International Dispute Settlement, 13 MAx PLANCK Y.B. UNITED NATIONS L. 61, 112
(2009).
21. U.S. Model Bilateral Investment Treaty (BIT), supra note 11, at art. 18
("Nothing in this Treaty shall be construed (1) to require a Party to furnish or allow
access to any information the disclosure of which it determines to be contrary to its
essential security interests; or (2) to preclude a Party from applying measures that it
considers necessary for the fulfillment of its obligations with respect to the maintenance
or restoration of international peace or security, or the protection of its own essential
security interests.").
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international investment.22 Today, worldwide protectionism is rising
under the guise of national security, especially in the pre-
establishment phase of international investment. Wary of "Made in
China 2025," the EU, United States, and Australia all are seeking to
shield their industries under the guise of national security.
23 Aiming
22. See Jilrgen Kurtz, Adjudging the Exceptional at International Investment
Law: Security, Public Order and Financial Crisis, 59 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 325, 342 (2010);
Katia Yannaca-Small, Essential Security Interests Under International Investment Law,
in INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT PERSPECTIVES: FREEDOM OF INVESTMENT IN A
CHANGING WORLD 93, 93 (OECD ed., 2007); William J. Moon, Essential Security Interests
in International Investment Agreements, 15 J. INT'L EcON. L. 481 (2012); Stephan W.
Schill, International Investment Law and the Host State's Power to Handle Economic
Crises-Comment on the ICSID Decision LG&E v. Argentina, 24 J. INT'L ARB. 265 (2007);
Jos6 Alvarez & Kathryn Khamsi, The Argentine Crisis and Foreign Investors: A Glimpse
into the Heart of the Investment Regime, in THE YEARBOOK ON INTERNATIONAL
INVESTMENT LAW AND POLICY 2008/2009 379 (Karl P. Sauvant ed., Oxford Univ. Press
2009).
23. In March 2018, CFIUS rejected a proposed takeover of Qualcomm, the San
Diego-based chip maker, by Singapore rival Broadcom over concerns that it would pose
a national security risk. Cecilia Kang & Alan Rappeport, Trump Blocks Broadcom's Bid
for Qualcomm, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 12, 2018, https://www.nytimes.com/2018/0
3 /1 2 /
technology/trump-broadcom-qualcomm-merger.html [https://perma.cc/Q2XX-43281
(archived Aug. 19. 2019). In January 2018, regulatory worries caused the collapse of a
plan by Ant Financial, a sister company of the Alibaba Group, the Chinese e-retailing
giant, to buy MoneyGram, the money-transfer provider. That deal would have been
worth $1.2 billion. Ana Swanson & Paul Mozur, MoneyGram and Ant Financial Call Off
Merger, Citing Regulatory Concerns, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 2, 2018, https://www.nytimes.com/
2018/01/02/business/moneygram-ant-financial-china-cflus.html [https://perma.cc/VP9S-
ERRL] (archived Aug. 19, 2019). In September 2017, the Trump administration blocked
the $1.3 billion purchase of Lattice Semiconductor, an American chip manufacturer, by
a Chinese-funded private equity firm. Ana Swanson, Trump Blocks China-Backed Bid
to Buy U.S. Chip Maker, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 13, 2017, https://www.nytimes.com/201
7 /
09/13/business/trump-lattice-semiconductor-china.htm1 [https:/perma.cc/GLR5-LXXX]
(archived Aug. 19, 2019). The German Ministry of Economy and Energy withdrew its
initial certificate of non-objection to the takeover of Aixtron (Germany) by a Chinese
company on 24 October 2016. On 2 December 2016, following a recommendation of
CFIUS, the U.S. President prohibited the acquisition of the United States subsidiary of
Aixtron by the same Chinese company on the basis of national security concerns. Paul
Mozur, Obama Moves to Block Acquisition of a German Chip Maker, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 2,
2016, https://www.nytimes.com/2016/12/02/business/ dealbook/china-aixtron-obama-
cflus.html [https://perma.cc/ BA28-BKNW] (archived Aug. 19, 2019). The CFIUS raised
concerns about a planned sale by the Dutch electronics group Philips of the majority of
its Lumiled (United States) LED lights unit to a consortium headed by Go Scale Capital
of China on the basis of an alleged threat to the national security of the country. In
January 2016, Phillips announced that it was abandoning the proposed sale. Maarten
van Tartwijk, Philips Nixes Lighting-Unit Sale to Chinese Investor as U.S. Rebuffs Deal,
WALL ST. J., Jan. 21, 2016, https://www.wsj.com/articles/philips-lighting-business-sale-
halted-by-regulatory-concerns-1453449046 [https://perma.cc/2JQQ-4GBC] (archived
Aug. 19, 2019). Xiamen Sanan Integrated Circuit announced in March 2016 its intention
of acquiring the Taiwan Province of China-based power electronics and chip foundry
GCS Holdings Inc, including its California-based subsidiary Global Communication
Semiconductors (GCS) LLC. The deal was abandoned on 1 August 2016 because of
concerns expressed by the CFIUS. Liz Alderman, Wary of China, Europe and Others
Push Back on Foreign Takeovers, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 15, 2018, https://www.nytimes.com/
2018/03/15/business/china-europe-canada-australia-deals.html [https://perma.cc/4CXJ-
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to fill this gap in the existing literature, this Article will
comprehensively explore this issue and provide a new, practical
methodology to resolve national security issues in international
investment. This Article takes the position that, upon international
tribunals' urging call, the model of compensation can incentivize state
parties to make careful choices, promote political efficiency, keep the
option of adopting essential security measures open, and balance the
interests of safeguarding the national security and protecting foreign
investment. Only when a practical solution is provided for how to deal
with national security in international investment can the
international investment legal regime have sustainable development.
In Part II, this Article will address the trend towards a common,
shared, and broad meaning of national security, as well as the rise of
the self-judging nature of security measures and the underlying
reasons for this rise. In Part III, this Article will explore whether
domestic courts or international tribunals can examine the national
security review process in the absence of an IIA, in both the pre-
establishment phase and the post-establishment phase. In this Part,
this Article also asserts that states are trying to build a Committee of
Foreign Investment in the United States (CFIUS)-style national
security review mechanism in the pre-establishment phase. Building
on that, this Article will discuss how to examine the process of national
security review in the pre-establishment phase and the post-
establishment phase. Part IV will examine the national security review
mechanism within the international investment treaty framework. In
this Part, this Article will examine whether international investment
tribunals can review non-self-judging essential security clauses or self-
judging essential security clauses. This Article concludes that
international investment tribunals review non-self-judging essential
security clauses under the "reasonable available" approach, while
international investment tribunals tend to review the self-judging
essential security issue under a "good faith" standard. Part V will
recommend an alternative option to deal with national security review
in the international investment legal regime-just compensation
should be paid to investors out of essential security measures. Part VI
concludes this paper with the possibility that some disputes about
essential security clauses may occur in the future.
KPWY] (archived Aug. 19, 2019). See Jamie Smyth, Australia to Tighten Foreign
Investment Rules Amid China Concerns, FIN. TIMES, Feb. 1, 2018, https://www.ft.com/
content/308ca8d6-06f6-1 e8-9650-9cOad2d7c5b5 [https://perma.cc/7T8T-2MAX]
(archived Sept. 4, 2019); Joseph Nasr, Germany Plans Tighter Scrutiny of Foreign
Investments in Defense, REUTERS, Aug. 8, 2018, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-
germany-m-algermany-plans-to-lower-screening-threshold-for-foreign-investment-in-
firms-idUSKBN1KT17C [https://perma.cc/T69X-GPUF] (archived Aug. 19. 2019).
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II. Two TRENDS IN NATIONAL SECURITY AND INTERNATIONAL
INVESTMENT
A. Towards a Broad, Shared Meaning of National Security
Originally, states linked national security with physical military
threats or protecting the territory of one nation from external military
threats and attacks.24 However, the notion of national security has
evolved, becoming a much more complex and comprehensive concept.
States and international arbitral panels share a broader
understanding of national security, which is not limited to physical
military threats.
Today, the scope of "national security" is generally defined
broadly. For example, on July 1, 2015, the National People's Congress
passed the People's Republic of China National Security Law (NSL)
and defined "national security" broadly. 25 In the NSL, "national
security" means a status in which the regime, sovereignty, unity,
territorial integrity, welfare of the people, sustainable economic and
social development, and other major interests of the state are faced
with relatively little danger, not threatened internally or externally,
and have the capability to maintain a sustained security status. 26
Some states do not define the term "national security" in their statutes;
rather, it is construed broadly to include all circumstances that have
the potential to have national security implications. For instance, in
the United States, the concept of national security is broadly construed
to include potential effects on critical infrastructure.
27 The Canadian
legislature does not define "national security" either, but rather the
Guidelines on the National Security Review of Investment provide
factors that should be taken into account to assess the potential threat
to Canadian national security by any proposed investment.
28
24. See David A. Baldwin, The Concept of Security, 23 REV. INT'L STUD. 5, 5
(1997).
25. National Security Law of People's Republic of China, art. 2, July 1, 2015
[hereinafter NSL]. The NSL was adopted at the 15th Session of the Standing Committee
of the 12th National People's Congress of the People's Republic of China on July 1, 2015.
The NSL came into effect from the date of promulgation.
26. Id.
27. 50 U.S.C. App. § 2170(a)(5) (2007); see also Foreign Investment Risk Review
Modernization Act of 2018, H.R. 5515, 115th Cong. § 1703 (2018) [hereinafter FIRRMA].
On August 13, the president again expanded the CFIUS mandate by signing FIRRMA
into law as part of the National Defense Authorization Act of 2018. Under FIRRMA,
"critical technologies" is updated to include "emerging technologies that could be
essential for maintaining or increasing the technological advantage of the United States
over countries of special concern with respect to national defense, intelligence, or other
areas of national security, or gaining such an advantage over such countries in areas
where such an advantage may not currently exist." Id.
28. The Guidelines are issued under section 38 of the Investment Canada Act by
the Minister of Innovation, Science and Economic Development, who is the Minister
VANDERBILT JOURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW
International tribunals also share a broad understanding of
national security. In LG&E Energy Corp. v. Argentine Republic, the
tribunal clearly rejected that essential security only refers to military
action and war.29 In Continental Casualty v. Argentine Republic, the
tribunal pointed out that the concept of international security covers
not only "political and military security but also the economic security
of States and of their population." 30 The International Law
Commission (ILC) argues that states have invoked necessity "to protect
a wide variety of interests, including safeguarding the environment,
preserving the very existence of the State and its people in time of
public emergency, or ensuring the safety of a civilian population."3 1
Furthermore, "national security" and "essential security" are
interchangeable with each other. Most IIAs express the object of
protection at the core of the exception through the terms "national
security," 32 "national security reasons," 3 or "essential security
interests." 34 The United Nations Conference on Trade and
Development (UNCTAD) proposes that these literal differences do not
actually intend to introduce a distinction between the terms and the
scopes they represent;35 but even the drafting history of IIAs evidences
substantive differences between these formulations. 36
responsible for the administration of the Act. Investment Canada Act, 28 R.S.C. 1985, §
38 (1985).
29. LG&E Energy Corp. et al. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/1,
Decision on Liability, ¶ 238 (Oct. 3, 2006), 46 ILM 36 (2007).
30. Continental Casualty Co. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/9,
Award, 1175 (Sept. 5, 2008).
31. ILC Commentary to Article 25, 2 Y.B. INT'L L. COMM'N. 25, 1 14 (2001).
32. Agreement Between the Government of the Republic of Hungary and the
Government of the Russian Federation for the Promotion and Reciprocal Protection of
Investments, Hung. -Russ., art. 2, Mar. 6, 1995 [hereinafter Hungary-Russia BIT].
33. Agreement Between the Government of the Kingdom of Sweden and the
Government of the United Mexican States Concerning the Promotion and Reciprocal
Protection of Investments, Mex.-Swed., art. 18, Oct. 3, 2000 [hereinafter Sweden-Mexico
BIT].
34. Agreement Between the State of Israel and Japan for the Liberalization,
Promotion and Protection of Investment, Isr.-Japan, art. 15.2, Feb. 1, 2017 [hereinafter
Israel-Japan BIT]; Comprehensive Economic Cooperation Agreement, India-Sing., art.
2.13, Apr. 8, 2002.
35. U.N. CONFERENCE ON TRADE & DEV., THE PROTECTION OF NATIONAL
SECURITY IN HAS, at 73, U.N. Doc. UNCTAD/DIAE/IA/2008/5, U.N. Sales No.
E.09.II.D.12 (2009) [hereinafter UNCTAD II].
36. The negotiation materials of the US - Israel FCN (1951) teach that, "security"
involves considerations of national defense while "safety" was construed as a narrower
concept that somewhat overlapped with "considerations of public order." Memorandum
of Conversation, Negotiation of Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation with
Israel, Nov. 20, 1950, NARA, U.S. Dep't of State File No. 611.84A4/11-2050. The
negotiations of US - Philippines FCN (1948) elucidate that "national emergencies" was
understood as such that "might not have regard to international situations; that a threat
of uprising or an earthquake might be a national emergency" and, that, this concept "had
a physical connotation, such as volcanic eruption or war." Telegram from the U.S.
Embassy in Manila to the U.S. Dep't of State, July 20, 1948, (NARA, U.S. Dep't of State
File No. 711.962/7-2048).
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Following a common shared, broad meaning of national security,
states adopt two strategies to protect their national security regarding
international investment. First, states develop screening systems on
national security grounds to review the appropriateness of foreign
investment in the pre-establishment phase. 37 Second, states enact
general essential security exception clauses in HAs, such as Article XI
of the United States-Argentina BIT, to reserve their competence to
adopt security-related measures.3 8
B. Towards a Self-Judging Nature of National Security Measures
While self-judging essential security clauses have traditionally
only occupied a minor place in the jurisprudence of international
investment tribunals, such clauses appeared frequently during the
process of the international investment legal regime's reorientation.
From the first BIT signed between Germany and Pakistan in 1959, the
international investment legal regime has gone through the "era of
infancy, era of dichotomy, era of proliferation and era of re-
orientation." 3 9 An emerging move in the international investment
arena is towards protecting states' sovereignty. 40 U.S. Senators
Elizabeth Warren and Bernie Sanders both opposed intrusion of
regulatory sovereignty imposed by the investor-state dispute
settlement (ISDS) regime. 41 Cecilia Malmstrom, the European
Commissioner for Trade, stated that ensuring states' regulatory
sovereignty is one important part of the EU's renewed vision of
international investment policy in the twenty-first century. 42 The
Indian government undertook a review of its 2003 Model BIT and made
a new draft that would provide the terms and conditions for India's
37. See infra Part III.A.
38. See infra Part II.B.
39. U.N. CONFERENCE ON TRADE & DEV., WORLD INVESTMENT REPORT 2015:
REFORMING INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT GOVERNANCE, at fig. IV.1, U.N. Sales No.
E.15.II.D.5 (2015) [hereinafter U.N. WORLD INVESTMENT REPORT].
40. Nikesh Patel, An Emerging Trend in International Trade: A Shift to
Safeguard against ISDS Abuses and Protect Host-State Sovereignty, 26 MINN. J. INT'L L.
273, 283 (2017).
41. See Bernie Sanders, Why I Oppose NAFTA, VT. TIMES, Oct. 28, 1993,
https://www.scribd.com/document/239210728/Why-I-Oppose-NAFTA-Vermont-Times-
Oct-28-1993 [https://perma.cc/SDC3-FC4V] (archived Sept. 3, 2019); Elizabeth Warren,




story.html [https://perma.cclRSA9-PZDV] (archived Aug. 19, 2019).
42. Cecilia Malmstrom, Investments in TTIP and Beyond - Towards an
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future trade negotiations.4 3 The new Indian Model BIT shifts towards
a more host-state friendly framework to protect states' sovereignty,
illustrated through such provisions as the Article 17 Security
Exceptions clause.4 4 India will reconsider and renegotiate its existing
BITs and ongoing negotiations with the United States.45 Similarly, as
a result of numerous ISDS claims challenging public policy and
regulatory measures in Canada, a growing backlash has developed
against ISDS.46 This trend towards protecting host states' sovereignty
provides the opportunity for states to make essential security clauses
more host-state friendly.
Following the Argentina series of cases involving the nature of
Article XI in the United States-Argentina BIT, states tend to move
from non-self-judging clauses to self-judging clauses due to wariness of
their sovereignty over essential security issues. 47 Originally, states
aimed to induce foreign investment and promote their economic growth
when signing BITs; 48 however, it is no longer necessary that BITs
promote economic development, especially for developing countries.49
Therefore, states are trying to change, or even back out of, their
existing HAs, to make the terms more favorable to their own interests.
In the era of reorientation, states have begun to evaluate the costs and
benefits of IIAs and reflect on their future strategies.5 0 A reflection in
this phase of reorientation is the rise of self-judging clauses in HAs.
43. See analysis of the 2015 Draft Model Indian Bilateral Investment Treaty, T
2.1.7, L. COMM'N of INDIA (Aug. 27, 2015).
44. Model Text for the Indian Bilateral Investment Treaty, art. 17, 2016,
https://www.mygov.in/sites/default/files/master-imageModel%2Text%20for%20the%2
Olndian%2OBilateral%20Investment%2OTreaty.pdf [https://perma.ccXGY4-94YH]
(archived Sept. 3, 2019).
45. See India Approves Model Bilateral Investment Treaty, BLOOMBERG, Feb. 11,
2016, https://www.bna.com/india-approves-model-n57982067216/ [https://perma.cc/
EYU2-8JZF] (archived Aug. 19, 2019).
46. See Scott Sinclair, Investor us. State: Canada is Being Pummeled by NAFTA
Corporate Lawsuits. Why Do We Put Up with It?, CANADIAN CTR. FOR POL'Y ALTS., July
1, 2015, https://www.policyalternatives.ca/publications/monitor/ investor-vs-state
[https://perma.cc/P2GG-T4A3] (archived Sept. 3, 2019).
47. Karl P. Sauvant et al., The Rise of Self-Judging Essential Security Interest
Clauses in International Investment Agreements, 188 COLUMBIA CTR. ON SUSTAINABLE
INV. 1 (Dec. 5, 2016), http://ccsi.columbia.edulfiles/2016/10/No-188-Sauvant-Ong-Lama-
and-Petersen-FOR-WEBSITE-FINAL.pdf [https://perma.cc/72CB-G36X] (archived Sept.
3, 2019).
48. The U.S.-Argentina BIT Preamble recognizes the importance of
"stimulat[ing] the flow of private capital and the economic development of the Parties."
U.S.-Argentina BIT, supra note 18, at art. XI.
49. Susan Rose-Ackerman & Jennifer Tobin, Do BITs Benefit Developing
Countries, in THE FUTURE OF INVESTMENT ARBITRATION 131-43 (Rogers & Alford eds.,
2009); see also Jeswald W. Salacuse & Nicholas P. Sullivan, Do BITs Really Work: An
Evaluation of Bilateral Investment Treaties and Their Grand Bargain, 46 HARV. INT'L
L.J. 67, 67 (2005).
50. U.N. WORLD INVESTMENT REPORT, supra note 39, at 50.
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The self-judging security clause is on the rise out of necessity. The
United States was the first to introduce the self-judging security clause
in 1992 in the BIT with the Russian Federation.5 ' Today, while the
United States, Canada, and Japan are the top three users of complete
self-judging clauses, a growing number of Asian and Latin American
countries are trying to follow this trend.52 The Columbia Center on
Sustainable Investment has conducted a study on the move from the
non-self-judging clause to the self-judging clause.53 According to this
study, 222 of 1,861 IIAs concluded by ninety countries before early
2016 contained self-judging security clauses.54 The percentage of IIAs
with self-judging security clauses has increased from a negligible
number in 2000 to over 60 percent of IIAs concluded in 2015.55 By early
2016, more than 134 countries, which together occupy 99 percent of
global outward Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) flows, had enacted
self-judging clauses in IIAs. 56
Self-judging security clauses are likely to spread around the globe,
since states try to protect essential security interests, especially with
the rise of sovereignty concerns.57 The rise of self-judging security
clauses makes international investment protections difficult,
subordinating treaty disciplines to governments' self-restraint. 5s
Broad and strong self-judging security clauses ramp up the potential
abuse by states to escape treaty obligations.5 9
III. EXAMINING NATIONAL SECURITY REVIEW IN THE ABSENCE OF THE
INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT TREATY FRAMEWORK
Each country has its own national security review regime. Upon
the analysis of several major states' national security review regimes,
this Article points out that these states try to create a CFIUS-like style
of national security review regime. Conducting national security
review of foreign investment needs to satisfy due process in accordance
with domestic law. Moreover, it will also need to satisfy
nondiscrimination requirements within the international minimum
standard.
51. Treaty Between the United States of America and the Russian Federation
Concerning the Encouragement and Reciprocal Protection of Investment, Russ.-U.S.,
art. 6, June 17, 1992, S. TREATY Doc. No. 33 [hereinafter U.S.-Russia BIT]; see also
Kenneth J. Vandevelde, U.S. Bilateral Investment Treaties: The Second Wave, 14 MICH.
J. INT'L L. 621, 686 (1993).





57. Id. at 2.
58. Id.
59. Id.
VANDERBILT JOURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW
A. The Convergence of National Security Review Mechanisms in the
Pre-Establishment Phase
This Part analyzes national security review regimes in the United
States, China, United Kingdom, Canada, and Russia, including the
composition of national security committees, and factors considered
while evaluating possible national security concerns. Based on the
analysis, this Part will point out the common characteristics of
national security review mechanisms in different countries.
States are trying to adopt a CFIUS-like structure, a review regime
of an interagency national security review committee, that comprises
several ministries and agencies to work on national security review
issues. Under the Exon-Florio amendment o the Defense Production
Act, 60 CFIUS has the authority to conduct national security reviews
and investigations of transactions that could result in foreign control
of a US business. 61 The Foreign Investment Risk Review
Modernization Act (FIRRMA) modernizes CFIUS's processes to better
enable timely and effective reviews of covered transactions.62 FIRRMA
further broadens the purview of CFIUS by explicitly adding four new
types of covered transactions.63 It expands the jurisdiction of CFIUS to
address growing national security concerns over foreign exploitation of
certain investment structures that traditionally have fallen outside of
CFIUS jurisdiction.64
In China, the national security review mechanism for foreign
investments was first introduced in 2011 by the State Council in the
Circular on Formalizing Security Review System for the Mergers and
60. 50 U.S.C. App. § 2170(a)(5) (2007) ("The term "national security" shall be
construed so as to include those issues relating to "homeland security," including its
application to critical infrastructure.").
61. See id. § 2170(d)(1) ("The President may take such action for such time as the
President considers appropriate to suspend or prohibit any covered transaction that
threatens to impair the national security of the United States.").
62. See Foreign Investment Risk Review Modernization Act of 2018, H.R. 5515,
115th Cong. § 1709 (2018).
63. Summary of the Foreign Investment Risk Review Modernization Act of 2018,
https://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/international/Documents/Summary-of-
FIRRMA.pdf (last visited Sept. 3, 2019) [https://perma.cc/W734-R2PK] (archived Sept.
3, 2019). The four new types of covered transactions include (1) a purchase, lease, or
concession by or to a foreign person of real estate located in proximity to sensitive
government facilities; (2) "other investments" in certain U.S. businesses that afford a
foreign person access to material nonpublic technical information in the possession of
the U.S. business, membership on the board of directors, or other decision-making rights,
other than through voting of shares; (3) any change in a foreign investor's rights
resulting in foreign control of a U.S. business or an "other investment" in certain U.S.
businesses; and (4) any other transaction, transfer, agreement, or arrangement designed
to circumvent CFIUS jurisdiction.
64. Foreign Investment Risk Review Modernization Act of 2018, H.R. 5515, 115th
Cong. § 1706 (2018).
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Acquisitions of Domestic Enterprises by Foreign Investors (the
Circular).65 In January 2015, the Ministry of Commerce (MOFCOM)
released the Law of the People's Republic of China (PRC) on Foreign
Investment (Draft for Comments) (2015 Draft Law) and an
accompanying explanation,66 providing the main national security
review regime in China. To ensure national security and to regulate
and promote foreign investment, the state established a unified foreign
investment national security review system, whereby all foreign
investments that threaten or may threaten national security undergo
review. 67 The State Council established an interministerial joint
committee for foreign investment national security review. 68 On
December 26, 2018, the Standing Committee of the National People's
Congress (NPC) of the PRC published Foreign Investment Law of the
People's Republic of China (Foreign Investment Law), purporting to
create a level playing field for foreign investments in China. 69
However, the Foreign Investment Law merely states the principles
that foreign investments are subject to national security review, and
that decisions made by the relevant authorities will be final. 70
Although the Foreign Investment Law does not say how the national
security review will be conducted, the final law will probably contain a
reference to the Circular or to other regulations that have been
implemented by that time.
In Russia, the Government Commission on Control over Foreign
Investments (Government Commission) is the main organization to
conduct national security review. Under the lead of the Chairman of
the Russian Government, the Government Commission is composed of
the heads of several ministries and institutions.
7 1 An acquirer must
file if the proposed acquisition results in the acquirer's control over a
strategic entity, which is an entity exercising activities of strategic
65. State Council, Circular on Formalizing Security Review System for the
Mergers and Acquisitions of Domestic Enterprises by Foreign Investors, PEOPLE'S
REPUBLIC OF CHINA (Feb. 3, 2011).
66. Comments of Draft Foreign Investment Law of the People's Republic of China
(Jan. 19, 2015), https://www.uschina.org/sites/default/files/2015%2ODraft%
2OForeign%
20Investment%20Law%20of%2O0the%20People%27s%20Republic%20of2OChinaJone
sDay_0.pdf [https://perma.cc/8TT3-RG8W] (archived Sept. 3, 2019) [hereinafter 2015
Draft Law]. The national security review mechanism for foreign investments was first
introduced in 2011 by the Ministry of Commerce in the Circular on Formalizing Security
Review System for the Mergers and Acquisitions of Domestic Enterprises by Foreign
Investors ("Circular 6"). The 2015 Draft Law contained 26 substantive and procedural
provisions regarding the national security review.
67. Id. at art. 48.
68. Hereinafter referred to as "Joint Committee."
69. Foreign Investment Law of China, 13th Cong. 2 (2019) (effective Jan. 1, 2020).
70. Id. at art. 35.
71. Although the final decision on the application is made by the Government
Commission, all the preparatory work is done by the Federal Antimonopoly Service
(FAS). FAS, among other things, performs a preliminary review of the application and
prepares materials for a further assessment by the Government Commission.
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importance to Russian national defense and security.72 The acquirer
should obtain consent from the Government Commission as a
prerequisite for the acquisition of a strategic entity; otherwise, the
acquisition of the strategic entity is void. 7 Certain transactions
regarding strategic entities or their property are exempt from
obtaining the Government Commission's approval.74
When conducting a national security review, states generally
apply reviews to a larger set of sectors that go beyond those
traditionally considered to be national security sensitive.7 5 In China,
there are eleven factors that shall be considered in carrying out a
national security review of a foreign investment, such as the influence
of technologies, key resources, and information and internet security.76
Based on the results of a national security review, the State Council or
the Joint Committee may issue an approval, a conditional approval, or
a rejection.7 7 In Canada, the government considers both the nature of
the asset and the identity and background of the parties involved in
the investment.7 8 Relevant parties may include any third parties that
could exercise influence with respect to the investment. 7 The
guidelines put forward specific factors related to national security that
the government may take into account during the review process.80 In
Russia, the Government Commission reviews transactions that result
in acquisition of strategic entities. 81 Currently, there are forty-six
activities of "strategic importance" that can cause the target to be
considered a strategic entity. 82 The forty-six activities encompass
areas related to natural resources, defense, media, and monopolies.83
72. To apply for the consent, the acquirer must submit an application to the FAS
with attachments, which include, among other things, corporate charter documents of
the acquirer and the target, information on their groups' structures (including the whole
chain of control over both the acquirer and the target), transaction documents, and a
business plan for the development of the target post-closing.
73. See Government Resolution No. 510 on the Government Commission for
Control over Foreign Investments in the Russian Federation, July 6, 2008.
74. Certain transactions include transactions in which the acquirer is ultimately
controlled by the Russian Federation, constituent entities of the Russian Federation or
a Russian citizen who is a Russian tax resident and does not have dual citizenship, as
well as certain intra-group transactions.
75. UNCTAD II, supra note 35, at 7-25.
76. 2015 Draft Law, supra note 66, art. 57.
77. Id. at art. 58.
78. Investment Canada Act, Guidelines on the National Security Review of




81. Procedures for Foreign Investments in Companies of Strategic Significance
for the Defense and Security of the State, art. 2, FED. L. No. 57-FZ (Apr. 29, 2008)
[hereinafter Russian Foreign Investments Law].
82. Id. at art. 6.
83. See Amendments to Federal Law No. 160-FZ "On Foreign Investments in the
Russian Federation," FED. L. No. 165-FZ (July 18, 2017) (containing a package of
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In the United States, CFIUS considers ten specific factors to assess the
transaction's effects on national security.84 Specifically, CFIUS tends
to focus on those transactions involving technology, defense, and
natural resources.85 FIRRMA revises and nearly doubles the number
of specific national security factors CFIUS may consider in its risk
reviews. 8 In addition to suspending or prohibiting a transaction,
FIRRMA empowers the president to take any additional action the
president considers appropriate to address the risk to the national
security.87
In sum, there are slightly different national security review
procedures in various countries. However, these procedures all tend to
be CFIUS-like structures of a national security review regime. They all
bear some "formalistic resemblance" to each other due to legal
transplantation among countries.8 8
B. Examining National Security Review in the International
Investment Pre-Establishment Phase
Without the restraints of the international investment treaty
framework, a state can generally adopt any measure to regulate
foreign investment out of a concern for national security.8 9 However,
any prospective investment-related measure safeguarding national
security should be guided by certain basic principles, including
nondiscrimination, transparency, and proportionality.
To protect national security, a state's discriminatory measures
against foreign investment should be compatible with international
law in the absence of an IIA. 9 0 A discrimination based on "sound
economic and political grounds" may be lawful unless it is based on
"nakedly racial grounds."9 1
International investment tribunals have held that no general
obligation exists under customary international law to treat all aliens
equally or as favorably as nationals. In Genin v. Estonia, the tribunal
amendments to Russian Foreign Investments Law. The amendments add the following
to the list of strategic activities: operating an electronic platform for state purchases,
closing the points of radioactive waste burial and using nuclear materials and
radioactive substances while conducting atomic energy works for defense purposes.
84. 50 U.S.C. App. § 2170(f) (2007). The eleventh factor is anything that the
President or Committee determines to be appropriate.
85. Id.
86. Foreign Investment Risk Review Modernization Act of 2018, H.R. 5515, 115th
Cong. § 1702(c) (2018).
87. Id. § 1722.
88. See Xingxing Li, National Security Review in Foreign Investments: A
Comparative and Critical Assessment on China and US Laws and Practices, 13
BERKELEY Bus. L.J. 255, 259 (2016). China's national security review system models on
the United State. The United Kingdom is suggested to adopt U.S. CIFUS-like style.
89. SORNARAJAN, supra note 9.
90. Id. at 105-06.
91. Id. at 137.
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noted that customary international law does not require that a state
treat "all aliens (and alien property) equally, or that it treat aliens as
favourably as nationals," and that "even unjustifiable differentiation
may not be actionable."9 2 In Grand River Enterprises Six Nations Ltd.
v. United States, the tribunal asserted that states may discriminate
against foreign investments in many ways, and states cannot be called
to account for "violating the customary minimum standard of
protection."9 3
Moreover, within the WTO framework, a state's discriminatory
measures against foreign investment are compatible with GATT
obligations. In the Canada-Administration of the Foreign Investment
Act, the Canadian system made the acceptance of foreign investment
proposals subject to the condition that investors export a certain
amount or portion of their production. 94 The GATT Panel upheld that
the Canadian system was compatible with the GATT. 95
But the Organization for Economic Co-operation and
Development (OECD) Recommendation of 2009 stresses that any
prospective investment-related measure introduced to safeguard
national security should be guided by certain basic principles.96 The
OECD Recommendation admits that the sovereign authority of each
state means it has the right to set forth policies in its territory and to
control foreign investment on national security grounds. 9 But the
OECD Recommendation emphasizes that any prospective measure
should be nondiscriminatory, have transparent policies and
predictable outcomes, proportional measures, and hold implementing
authorities accountable. 98 In addition to these principles, it
recommends to procedural fairness, codification and publication, prior
notification, consultation, disclosure of investment policy actions,
regulatory proportionality, narrow focus, appropriate expertise,
tailored responses, last resort, and the self-judging nature of essential
security concerns.9 9
92. Alex Genin, Eastern Credit Ltd., & A.S. Baltoil v. Republic of Est., ICSID
Case No. ARB 99/2, Award, T 368 (June 25, 2001), 17 ICSID Rev. 395 (2002).
93. Grand River Enterprises Six Nations Ltd., et al. v. U.S., ICSID Case No.
ARB/10/5, Award, ¶¶ 208-09 (Jan. 12, 2011).
94. See Report of the Panel, Canada-Administration of the Foreign Investment
Act, art. 3.1, L/5540-30S/140 (Feb. 7, 1984), GATT BISD (1984).
95. Id. at T 6.2.
96. ORG. FOR ECON. COOPERATION & DEV. (OECD), GUIDELINES FOR RECIPIENT
COUNTRY INVESTMENT POLICIES RELATING TO NATIONAL SECURITY 2 (adopted May 25,
2009) [hereinafter OECD RECOMMENDATION].
97. Id. at art. III.
98. Id. at art. I-II.
99. Id. at art. II-III.
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C. Examining National Security Review in International Investment
in the Post-Establishment Phase
The process of national security review in the post-establishment
phase should satisfy requirements under two kinds of law, domestic
law and customary international law. Domestic law-usually a state's
constitution-requires government organs to act with due process,
while customary international law mandates states act under an
"international minimum standard," a standard shared by the
international community.
With respect to domestic legal requirements, domestic courts often
apply the political question doctrine to justify their inability to review
a case involving national security and deference to executive
branches.100 Since September 11, 2001, federal courts have decided
several cases involving issues of national security.
0 1 Recent litigation
indicates that this doctrine is still a vibrant aspect of federal case
law.102
In Schneider v. Kissinger in 2005, the survivors of a former
Chilean general killed in a military coup backed by the United States
sued the United States and former National Security Advisor Henry
Kissinger under the Federal Tort Claims Act for "negligent failure to
prevent summary execution, arbitrary detention, cruel, inhumane, or
degrading treatment, torture, wrongful death, and assault and battery,
and . . . for intentional infliction of emotional distress." 103 The D.C.
Circuit affirmed a district court ruling that the court lacked
jurisdiction under the political question doctrine to adjudicate this
case. 104 Upon dismissing the lawsuit, the circuit court stated that
"there could still be no doubt that decision-making in the fields of
foreign policy and national security is textually committed to the
political branches of government."05
But domestic courts were intent on compensating investors for the
harm caused by national security measures. The Ralls v. CFIUS
decision is a landmark case in the history of CFIUS reviews. 106 The
legal challenge brought marked the first time that a foreign company,
100. Haig v. Agee, 453 U.S. 280, 292 (1981); see also Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453
U.S. 654, 688 (1981); Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57, 64-68 (1981); Greer v. Spock, 424
U.S. 828, 837-38 (1976); Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733, 756, 758 (1974); Harisiades v.
Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580, 589 (1952).
101. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 507 (2004); Rumsfeld v. Padilla, 542 U.S.
426, 426 (2004); Coalition of Clergy v. Bush, 310 F.3d 1153, 1153 (9th Cir. 2003);
Mahorner v. Bush, 224 F. Supp. 2d 48, 48 (D.D.C. 2002).
102. Since a small fraction of cases reach the Supreme Court, the decisions
rendered by the Courts of Appeals and District Courts become more significant.
103. Schneider v. Kissinger, 412 F.3d 190, 192-93 (D.C. Cir. 2005).
104. Id. at 194.
105. Id.
106. Ralls Corp. v. Comm. on Foreign Inv. in the U.S. (Ralls 1), 926 F. Supp. 2d 71,
76 (D.D.C. 2013).
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as well as the courts, had formally argued that CFIUS decisions are
open to judicial review. The court's holding, moreover, gave
unprecedented recognition of a foreign company's property rights and
protection under due process.0 7 Despite the fact that FIRRMA limits
the judicial review to a review of the government's administrative
record in reaching a decision, Ralls is still a compelling decision in
examining the due process of national security review. 0 8
In March 2012, a Delaware corporation, Ralls, acquired four
Oregon wind farm project companies from an American owner. i09 Ralls
was owned by two Chinese nationals who were also the CFO and a Vice
President of the Sany Group (Sany), a Chinese manufacturing
company.110 Ralls intended to acquire the wind farm project companies
to use Sany wind turbines and demonstrate their quality and
reliability to the US wind industry. "I After the acquisition was
completed, CFIUS halted and U.S. President Barack Obama
subsequently ordered Ralls to divest its acquisition of four wind farm
project companies in Oregon because of their proximity to a U.S. Navy
weapons testing and training facility.112
Ralls filed a lawsuit challenging the CFIUS and presidential
orders in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia."13 The
District Court ruled against Ralls, citing, inter alia, its failure to file
advance notice of the transaction with CFIUS and the nonreviewable
nature of the president's actions.114 A federal appeals court ruled in
favor of Ralls."5 The D.C. Circuit unprecedentedly allowed judicial
review of a due process challenge to presidential orders in CFIUS
reviews. 116 Moreover, it stated that foreign investors do have
constitutionally protected state property rights after the close of a
transaction, and those rights could not be deprived without due process
protections, such as notice of deprivation, access to unclassified
evidence, and opportunity for rebuttal.117
107. Ralls Corp. v. Comm. on Foreign Inv. in the U.S. (Ralls Il), 758 F.3d 296, 318
(D.C. Cir. 2014).
108. Foreign Investment Risk Review Modernization Act of 2018, H.R. 5515, 115th
Cong. § 1715 (2018).
109. Complaint at TT 2, 27-28, Ralls II, 758 F.3d 296 (No. 12-01513).
110. Id. at 1 29.
111. Id.
112. The sites of the Butter Creek projects overlap with a United States Navy
restricted airspace and bombing zone that is used by military aircraft based out of Naval
Air Station Whidbey Island, according to the court's memorandum opinion. Shortly after
Ralls acquired the project companies, the United States Navy expressed concerns
regarding the location of one of the wind farms, and Ralls agreed to move it to a new
location, still within the restricted airspace. See id.
113. Ralls I, 926 F. Supp. 2d at 76.
114. Id. at 71, 86-92.
115. Ralls II, 758 F.3d at 296.
116. Id. at 311.
117. Id. at 318 (citing Greene v. McElroy, 360 U.S. 474, 496 (1959); Gray Panthers
v. Schweiker, 652 F.2d 146, 165 (D.C. Cir. 1980)).
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The D.C. Circuit did not decide on the constitutionality of
deprivations of Ralls's property, since this case was settled in the
end.118 And this case provided the potential liability of the United
States if the United States, out of national security measures, caused
property damages for Ralls.1 19 Moreover, Ralls alleged that it was
treated singularly and unfairly with a CFJUS order when hundreds of
other similarly situated turbines were within the area of the restricted
airspace.120 Thus, it claimed that CFIUS and the president violated its
equal protection rights under the Fifth Amendment of the
Constitution.1 2 1 A merit ruling on this issue would have resulted in
unprecedented review of CFIUS orders.
With respect to customary international law, the process of
national security review should meet the "international minimum
standard." While requiring an "international minimum standard"
imposes additional requirements to domestic law; it is, indeed, a
minimum standard.122 The Neer Commission pointed out that a breach
of the minimum standard of the treatment of aliens as requiring a
treatment that amounts "to bad faith, to willful neglect of duty, or to
an insufficiency of governmental action so far short of international
standards that every reasonable and impartial man would readily
recognize its insufficiency."123 A few other historical cases applied this
international minimum standard, or a similarly worded standard, in
connection with the treatment of aliens. 124 Further, the minimum
standard of treatment is evolving.125 Today's minimum standard is
broader than that defined in the Neer case and its progeny.12
6
Notably in Ralls there were other wind farms owned by foreign
companies in the proximity of the airbase, but Ralls's wind farms were
118. On October 9, 2015, it was announced in a joint status report by the parties
that Ralls and CFIUS had entered into a settlement agreement and determined it was
not necessary for CFIUS to issue a new recommendation to the President on the matter.
Joint Status Report and Joint Motion to Stay Litigation Deadlines, at 1, Ralls Corp. v.
Comm. on Foreign Inv., No. 1:12-cv-01513 (D.C. Cir. Oct. 9, 2015). Reportedly, under the
terms of the settlement, Ralls was still required to sell the disputed assets to a third-
party purchaser. See also Stephen Dockery, Chinese Wind Company Settles with U.S. in
CFIUS Battle, WALL ST. J. BLOG (Oct. 9, 2015, 6:45 PM), https:/Iblogs.wsj.com/riskand
compliance/2015/10/09/chinese-wind-company-settles-with-u-s-in-cfius-battle/?mod=
article-inline [https://perma.cc/2CKB-GSKF] (archived Aug. 19, 2019).
119. Amended Complaint at 147-48, Ralls I, 926 F. Supp. 2d 71 (No. 1:12-cv-
01513).
120. Id. at 161-63.
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. LFH Neer & Pauline Neer (U.S. v. Mex.), 4 R.I.A.A. 60, 61-62 (1926).
124. Jan Paulsson & Georgios Petrochilos, "Neer-ly Misled?", 22 ICSID Rev.-
Foreign Inv. L.J., 242, 242-57 (2007).
125. See International Law Association, Final Report of the International
Committee on Diplomatic Protection of Persons and Property, Res. No. 5/2006 (June 4-8,
2006).
126. Merrill & Ring Forestry L.P. v. Can., ICSID Case No. UNCT/07/1, Award, 213
(Mar. 31, 2010).
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singled out. 127 CFIUS was actually more concerned about the close
position of Ralls's project to military bases rather than the foreign
ownership of the wind farm.128 Ralls had alleged that it was treated
unfairly with a CFIUS order when hundreds of other similarly situated
turbines were within the area of the restricted airspace.129 Here Ralls
could have also argued that this discrimination violated customary
international law-international minimum standard of treatment as
an evolving concept-by asserting unfair treatment from CFIUS.o30
IV. EXAMINING NATIONAL SECURITY REVIEW WITHIN THE
INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT TREATY FRAMEWORK
In this Part, self-judging and non-self-judging security clauses will
be analyzed. Building upon this distinction, the tribunals adopt
different attitudes toward the capacity of reviewing these security
clauses. Moreover, the tribunals adopt various approaches to reviewing
different security clauses. With respect to non-self-judging essential
security clauses, investment tribunals have the competence to review
them; and in reviewing these clauses, the "reasonable available"
approach is better than the "only way" approach. With respect to self-
judging essential security clauses, the tribunals tend to adopt the
traditional "good faith" approach in reviewing self-judging essential
security clauses.
A. Review of Non-Self-Judging Security Clauses
This Part will analyze whether Article XI of the Argentina-United
States BIT is self-judging, that is, if the state adopting the measures is
the sole arbiter of the scope and application of that rule, or whether the
invocation of necessity is subject to judicial review. In the cases CMS
v. Argentina, LG&E v. Argentina, Enron v. Argentina, Sempra v.
Argentina, and Continental Casualty v. Argentina, all of which
occurred in the wake of the Argentine economic crisis, each tribunal
addressed the nature of Article XI of the Argentina-United States BIT
and asserted its non-self-judging nature.
127. See Amended Complaint, supra note 119.
128. Ralls Corp. v. Comm. on Foreign Inv. in the U.S. (Ralls 1), 926 F. Supp. 2d 71,
78 (D.D.C. 2013).
129. See Amended Complaint, supra note 119.
130. Whether U.S. domestic court can apply customary international law is
arguable. See generally Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, Customary International
Law as Federal Common Law: A Critique of the Modern Position, 110 HARV. L. REV. 815
(1997); Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, The Current Illegitimacy of International
Human Rights Litigation, 66 FORDHAM L. REV. 319 (1997); Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L.
Goldsmith, Federal Courts and the Incorporation of International Law, 111 HARV. L.
REV. 2260 (1998); Harold Hongju Koh, Is International Law Really State Law, 111 HARv.
L. REV. 1824 (1997).
920 [VOL. 52.:899
2019] INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENTAND NATIONAL SECURITY REVIEW 921
1. The Reviewability of Non-Self-Judging Security Clauses
The cases discussed are based on the same facts, which can be
briefly summarized. The Argentine Republic started economic reforms
in 1989, which included the privatization of important industries and
public utilities as well as the participation of foreign investment. 131
Toward the end of the 1990s, a serious economic crisis began to unfold
in Argentina, producing profound political and social consequences.
32
Following the deepening crisis in 2001, the Emergency Law was
enacted in 2002, which introduced a reform of the foreign exchange
system-the peso was devalued and different exchange rates were
introduced for different transactions.13 3 The right of licenses of public
utilities to adjust tariffs according to the U.S. Producer Price Index was
terminated, as was the calculation of tariffs in dollars.1
34 Investors
turned to the International Centre for Settlement of Investment
Disputes (ICSID), claiming that Argentina destroyed the regulatory
environment on which foreign investors had relied ex ante.1
35
The CMS tribunal claimed that if states would like to "unilaterally
determine the legitimacy of extraordinary measures importing non-
compliance with obligations assumed in a treaty, they do so
expressly."136 The wording of Article XI of the BIT, as given above,
allows the parties to take "measures necessary"-not measures that a
party considers as such. 137 Applying a textual approach, and
comparing Article XI of the BIT with differently worded provisions in
GATT Article XXI, the CMS tribunal pointed out that the tribunal was
able to review Article XI of the Argentina-United States BIT.
38 The
CMS tribunal also derived its findings from Nicaragua I, Nicaragua II,
and the Oil Platforms case.'39 The tribunal further pointed out that
the tribunal's review would be a substantive one, including examining
whether "the state of necessity or emergency meets the conditions laid
down by customary international law and the treaty provisions and
whether it thus is or is not able to preclude wrongfulness."
40
131. See Continental Casualty Co v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No.
ARB/03/9, Decision on the Application for Partial Annulment of Continental Casualty
Company and the Application for Partial Annulment of the Argentine Republic, 1 107
(Sept. 16, 2011) [hereinafter Continental Casualty, Annulment Proceeding].
132. For a description of the financial crisis, see Martin Feldstein, Argentina's Fall:
Lessons from the Latest Financial Crisis, FOREIGN AFFAIRS, Mar--Apr. 2002.
133. CMS Gas Transmission Co. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/8,
Award, ¶ 64 (May 12, 2005) [hereinafter CMS Award].
134. Id. at 1 65.
135. See Continental Casualty, Annulment Proceeding, supra note 131, at ¶ 19.
136. Id. at T 370.
137. U.S.-Argentina BIT, supra note 18, at art. XI.
138. CMS Award, supra note 133, at 1 370.
139. Id. at 1 371.
140. Id. at T 374.
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The LG&E tribunal pointed out that Article XI of the BIT did not
specify who, Argentina itself or the tribunal, should decide what
constitutes essential security measures.141 The United States did not
consider the nature of essential security clauses as self-judging until
the Russia-United States BIT of 1992 and the 1992 U.S. Model BIT;
both the Russia-United States BIT and the U.S. Model BIT were
concluded after the signing of the Argentina-United States BIT, and
both of them noted explicitly the change in US policy toward seeing
essential security provisions as self-judging.142 Therefore, the LG&E
tribunal pointed out that it could review Article XI and went on to
decide the substantive issue of whether the measures adopted were
necessary. 143 That is, Article XI does not empower one party to
unilaterally assert the exception of security necessity.
The Enron case analyzed the language of GATT XX, as well as the
International Court of Justice's (ICJ) opinions in the Nicaragua II and
the Oil Platforms cases, and concluded that the legal text reflected the
intent that states did not confirm the self-judging interpretation.144
The Enron tribunal further asserted that judicial review, not limited
to measures taken in good faith, could be substantive to examine the
facts and whether they qualify under the requirements of a state of
necessity.145 Following Enron, the Sempra tribunal reached the same
conclusion of the non-self-judging nature of Article XI of the BIT.1 46
In Continental Casualty, the tribunal based its judgment on the
language of the clause, the ICJ's twice-repeated interpretation of
substantially identical provisions, and the interpretation under Article
31 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT). Again, the
tribunal achieved the conclusion of the non-self-judging nature of the
recourse to Article XI.147
In sum, all of the tribunals asserted the non-self-judging nature of
Article XI of the Argentina-United States BIT.
2. The Approaches for Necessity Test
The doctrine of necessity is a recognized principle of customary
international law; however, it has been strictly limited by the
International Law Commission (ILC) Commentary and international
141. LG&E Energy Corp., et al., v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/1,
Award, ¶ 212 (Oct. 3, 2006) [hereinafter LG&E Award].
142. Id. at T 213.
143. Id.
144. Enron Corp. & Ponderosa Assets, L.P. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID, Case No.
ARB/01/3, Award, T¶ 335-36 (May 22, 2007) [hereinafter Enron Award].
145. Id. at¶ 339.
146. Sempra Energy Int.'l v. Republic of Argentina, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/16,
Award, I¶ 379-88 (Sept. 28, 2007) [hereinafter Sempra Award].
147. Continental Casualty Co. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/9,
Award, ¶ 187 (Sept. 5, 2008) [hereinafter Continental Casualty Award].
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tribunals to avoid the potential abuse by states. 148 The ILC
Commentary states that "necessity will only rarely be available to
excuse non-performance of an obligation" and "is subject to strict
limitations to safeguard against possible abuse."149 The successful
invocation of the doctrine of necessity is virtually impossible, especially
in the international investment area.150 To decide whether essential
security measures adopted are indeed necessary, the necessity test
required for the application of the BIT must be determined. The CMS,
Enron, and Sempra tribunals adopted the "only way" approach, while
the Continental Casualty tribunal evaluated the plea of necessity
under the "reasonable available" approach.'5 '
The "only way" test comes from Article 25 of the ILC Articles on
State Responsibility:
Art. 25:
1. Necessity may not be invoked by a State as a ground for precluding the
wrongfulness of an act not in conformity with an international obligation of that
State unless the act:
(a) is the only way for the State to safeguard an essential interest against a grave
and imminent peril; and
(b) does not seriously impair an essential interest of the State or States towards
which the obligation exists, or of the international community as a whole.
2. In any case, necessity may not be invoked by a State as a ground for precluding
wrongfulness if:
(a) the international obligation in question excludes the possibility of invoking
necessity; or
(b) the State has contributed to the situation of necessity.
1 5 2
According to ILC commentaries, to invoke the customary necessity
defense successfully, states need to meet all of its requirements
148. International Law Commission, Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for
Internationally Wrongful Acts with Commentaries, art. 25 (2001) [hereinafter ILC
Articles]; see also August Reinisch, Necessity in International Investment Arbitration-An
Unnecessary Split of Opinions in Recent ICS1D Cases-Comments on CMS v. Argentina
and LG&E v. Argentina, 8 J. WORLD INV. & TRADE 191 (2007).
149. ILC Commentary to Article 25, supra note 31, at 195.
150. See Andrea K. Bjorklund, Emergency Exceptions to International Obligations
in the Realm of Foreign Investment: The State of Necessity and Force Majeure as
Circumstances Precluding Wrongfulness, in OXFORD HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL
INVESTMENT LAW (Peter Muchlinski et al. eds., 2008).
151. See CMS Award, supra note 133, at 1 316; Enron Award, supra note 144, at
1 305-08; Sempra Award, supra note 146, at 1 347-50; Continental Casualty Award,
supra note 147, at ¶ 195.
152. ILC Articles, supra note 148, at art. 25.
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cumulatively. 153 The "only way" element embedded in Article 25(1)(a)
requires a state to show that it had no way to protect its essential
interests other than breaching its international obligations.154 In other
words, a state would fail to meet this requirement if there are other
means available to respond to emergency situations, even if they are
more costly or less convenient.
The CMS tribunal assessed whether the state of necessity met the
conditions set by customary international law and the treaty
provisions, and whether it was able to preclude wrongfulness or not. 155
The Enron tribunal claimed that the treaty was inseparable from the
customary law standard for the operation of the state of necessity. 156
The Sempra tribunal interpreted Article XI of the BIT under the
requirements of the customary necessity defense.'5 7
The CMS, Enron, and Sempra tribunals' awards were all
challenged by separate annulment committees. 158 Although the CMS
annulment committee did not annul the award, it stressed that the
CMS tribunal should have analyzed pleadings under the two norms
separately as they are meant to function differently. 1s The Sempra
annulment committee annulled the tribunal's award.160 The Sempra
annulment committee held that the tribunal failed to separately
analyze and apply Article XI in the BIT, constituting a total failure to
apply the law and exercising a "manifest excess of powers."161 The
Enron annulment committee found that the tribunal had failed to
provide reasons for the adoption of the "only way" approach. 162
153. ILC Commentary to Article 25, supra note 31, at 80. The requirements are:
(1) a threat to an "essential interest" of a particular state; (2) a "grave and imminent
peril" to that interest; (3) the action taken is the "only way" to preserve that essential
interest; (4) that the situation was not caused by the state in question seeking to invoke
the plea; (5) that action does not impair the interests of other states; and (6) the action
lasts only as long as the situation persists.
154. James Crawford, Introduction, Texts, and Commentaries, in THE
INTERNATIONAL LAW COMMISSION's ARTICLES ON STATE RESPONSIBrMTY: INTRODUCTION
184 (Cambridge Univ. Press 2002).
155. CMS Award, supra note 133, at 1 374.
156. Enron Award, supra note 144, at ¶ 334.
157. Sempra Award, supra note 146, at J¶ 376, 378.
158. CMS Transmission Co. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/8, Ad
Hoc Committee on the Application for Annulment, T 1 (Sept. 25, 2007) [hereinafter CMS
Transmission Annulment Proceeding]; Enron Corp. & Ponderosa Assets, L.P. v.
Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/3, Decision on the Application for
Annulment of the Argentine Republic, ¶ 1 (July 30, 2010) [hereinafter Enron Annulment
Proceeding]; Sempra Energy International v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No.
ARB/02/16, Decision on the Argentine Republic's Application for Annulment of the
Award, 1 1 (June 29, 2010) [hereinafter Sempra Annulment Proceeding].
159. CMS Transmission Annulment Proceeding, supra note 158, at ¶ 135.
160. Sempra Annulment Proceeding, supra note 158, at 1 214.
161. Id. at I¶ 213-14.
162. Enron Annulment Proceeding, supra note 158, at ¶ 349.
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However, the Enron annulment committee did not indicate whether it
agreed with the tribunal's approach or not.163
In sum, the CMS, Enron, and Sempra tribunals interpreted
Article XI of the BIT under the requirements of the customary
necessity defense and found that the measures Argentina adopted as a
response to the crisis failed to meet the "only way" test. However, these
three separate annulment committees disagreed with the tribunals.1
64
Besides the "only way" approach, the "reasonable available"
approach is widely used by the WTO in interpreting "necessity"
clauses. It was first interpreted by the GATT Panel in Section 337 of
the Tariff Act of 1930165 when the United States claimed that the
measure in question was necessary under GATT Article XX(d) to
secure compliance with domestic patent laws. 166 The United States
argued that Section 337 provided the only means of enforcement of US
patent rights against imports of products manufactured abroad by
means of a process patented in the United States.'67 In this regard, the
Panel stated:
A contracting party cannot justify a measure inconsistent with another GATT
provision as "necessary" if an alternative measure which it could reasonably be
expected to employ and which is not inconsistent with other GATT provisions is
available to it. By the same token, in cases where a measure consistent with
other GATT provisions is not reasonably available, a contracting party is bound
to use, among the measures reasonably available to it, that which entails the
least degree of inconsistency with other GATT provisions.1
6 8
The "reasonable available" approach was first used in the
Continental Casualty case in the international investment law area. 169
The Continental Casualty tribunal abandoned the necessity analysis
within the framework of customary international law.17
0 Instead, the
tribunal adopted the "reasonable available" approach applied within
GATT and WTO case law.17 ' The Continental Casualty tribunal's task
was to determine whether Argentina had no other "reasonable choice
available" to protect its essential security interests to justify the plea
of necessity by Argentina.172 The Continental Casualty award survived
163. Id.
164. See Sempra Annulment Proceeding, supra note 158.
165. REPORT OF THE PANEL UNITED STATES-SECTION 337 OF THE TARIFF ACT OF
1930, Foreign Trade Information System, Organization of American States, L/6439-
36S/345 (1989), http://www.sice.oas.org/dispute/gatt/87TA33
7 4 .asp [https://perma.cc/
NJT6-635U] (archived Sept. 3, 2019) [hereinafter PANEL REPORT].
166. Id. at ¶ 3.59.
167. Id. at ¶ 3.62.
168. Id. at ¶ 5.26.
169. See Continental Casualty Award, supra note 147, at 1 195.
170. Id. at ¶ 192.
171. Id. at TT 187-282, 292-96, 299, 308, 343, 349, 413.
172. Id. at T 199.
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annulment. 173 The Continental Casualty annulment committee
affirmed the distinction between Article XI of the BIT and the
customary international law defense of necessity.174
Several reasons can account for the adoption of the "reasonable
available" approach to evaluate the plea of the necessity of the
measures. First, Article XX of GATT case law has developed the
"reasonable available" approach to review essential security
measures.1 75 Article XI of the BIT derived from the U.S. Model BIT and
the U.S. Friendship, Commerce and Navigation (FCN) treaties, which
are supposed to derive from Article XX of GATT.1 76 For this reason, it
would be natural for the investment tribunals to follow the Article XX
case law and adopt the "reasonable available" methodology to review
essential security issues.
Second, since both GATT and WTO case law have extensively
dealt with national treatment issues, it would be more appropriate to
interpret necessity as an exception of national treatment according to
the understanding of GATT and WTO case law. A common
denominator in both the trade and investment treaties is the norm
against discrimination.1 7 7 For the national treatment norms across the
WTO law and international investment law, the cases SD Myers v.
Canada,178 Pope & Talbot v. Canada,179 Occidental v. Ecuador,18 0 and
Methanex v. the United States'8 illustrate how the WTO legal norms
are used by international investment tribunals. And the application of
like circumstances is to be found in trade treaties, and principles could
be borrowed from international trade law when comparisons are
made. 182 Therefore, it would be more appropriate to interpret the
exception, necessity, according to the understanding of GATT and
WTO case law.
173. Continental Casualty, Annulment Proceeding, supra note 131, at Part V.
174. Id. at ¶} 127-28.
175. See PANEL REPORT, supra note 165, ¶ 7.104 (summing up the Appellate Body
case law in the following WTO disputes: Korea-Beef, at ¶ 164; EC-Asbestos, at 1 172,
U.S.-Gambling, at ¶ 306; Dominican Republic-Cigarettes, at ¶ 70).
176. Continental Casualty Award, supra note 147, at T192.
177. Both the WTO Agreement and international investment agreements contain
clauses on Most-Favored-Nation principle and National Treatment principle, the basic
principles against discrimination.
178. S.D. Myers, Inc. v. Government of Can., NAFTA/UNICTRAL Trib., Partial
Award, ¶¶ 244-47 (Nov. 13, 2000).
179. Pope & Talbot Inc. v. Government of Can., NAFTA/UNICTRAL Trib., Award
on the Merits of Phase 2, ¶J 45-72 (Apr. 10, 2001).
180. Occidental Exploration & Prod. Co. v. Republic of Ecuador, LCIA Case No.
UN3467, Award, T1 173-77 (London Ct. Int'l Arb. 2004).
181. Methanex Corp. v. U.S., NAFTA/UNICTRAL Trib., Final Award, 11 29-38
(Aug. 3, 2005).
182. Nicholas DiMascio & Joost Pauwelyn, Nondiscrimination in Trade and
Investment Treaties: Worlds Apart or Two Sides of the Same Coin?, 102 AM. J. INT'L L.
48, 49 (2008).
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Third, the content of and the conditions to invoke Article XI
defenses and customary international law defenses are different.
Article XI has been defined as a safeguard clause, allowing states to
escape from their commitments.1 8 3 In customary international law,
necessity is taken into account as a "ground for precluding the
wrongfulness of an act not in conformity with an international
obligation," under certain strict conditions. 184 The conditions of
application are also different. The strict conditions to which the ILC
text subjects the invocation of the defense of necessity by a state is
explained by the fact that it can be invoked in any context against any
international obligation.185 Therefore "it can only be accepted on an
exceptional basis."186 This is not necessarily the case under Article XI
of the BIT. Invocation of Article XI under the BIT, as a specific
provision limiting the general investment protection obligations
bilaterally agreed to by the contracting parties, is not necessarily
subject to the same conditions of application as the plea of necessity
under general international law. 187
Fourth, trade and investment are closely associated on global
value chains. With the rise of global value chains led by multinational
corporations, trade and investment laws have similar ends through
different regimes. 188 Both trade and investment frameworks, of a
mutually reinforcing nature, are designed against discrimination and
protectionism.189 The two fields are closely interrelated, and many
modern preferential trade agreements contain not only rules with
respect to trade but also rules related to investment.19 0 For this reason,
it would be more appropriate to adopt a similar approach to review the
non-self-judging clause between international trade law and
international investment law.
In sum, the "reasonable available" approach is much more
appropriate than the "only way" approach in determining whether the
invocation of necessity embedded in essential security non-self-judging
clauses is justified. The derivation of Article XI of the BIT, the similar
function of necessity exceptions between the WTO and investment, the
183. Alan Sykes, Protectionism as a "Safeguard": A Positive Analysis of the GATT
"Escape Clause" with Normative Speculations, 58 U. CHI. L. REV. 255, 258 (1991).
184. See ILC Articles, supra note 148, at 201 (commentary to article 25).
185. JLC Article 26 states the exception as those "arising under a peremptory norm
of general international law." Id.
186. See ILC Articles, supra note 148, at 195, 1 14 ("to emphasize the exceptional
nature of necessity and concerns about its possible abuse, article 25 is cast in negative
language.").
187. Id. at ¶ 21 ("as embodied in Art. 25, the plea of necessity is not intended to
cover conduct which is in principle regulated by the primary obligations.").
188. See Sungloon Cho & Jilrgen Kurtz, Convergence and Divergence in
International Economic Law and Politics, 29 EUR. J. INT'L L. 169, 179-82 (2008).
189. Id.
190. See China-Australia Free Trade Agreement (ChAFTA), Austl.-China, Dec.
20, 2015, Ch. 9.
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differences between the Article XI and customary international law
defenses, and the interlinking of trade and investment all contribute
to the preference of the "reasonable available" approach.
B. Review of Self-Judging Security Clauses
A treaty only includes meaningful language; permissive wording
would be included in a treaty only if it were thought of as necessary to
overcome certain interpretative obstacles. Thus, it appears that an
explicit self-judging clause fully empowers state parties as the sole
arbiter to apply their own essential security measures. However,
relevant WTO cases and NAFTA clauses reject this interpretation.
WTO cases provide similar or even the same language with self-
judging clauses in IIAs, while the regional agreement NAFTA provides
specific regulation on international investment and essential
security.1 9 1 This Part will analyze relevant WTO cases and NAFTA
clauses to explore whether a tribunal can review the explicit self-
judging essential security clause.
1. The Reviewability of Self-Judging Security Clauses
In international economic law, WTO cases and NAFTA provisions
all provide some clue on the reviewability of the self-judging essential
security clause. In the WTO Framework, GATT Article XXI offers
reference on the nature of the self-judging essential security clause. 192
The self-judging nature of GATT Article XXI was first addressed in an
early dispute between Czechoslovakia and the United States,
concerning an import ban imposed by the United States on national
security grounds. 193 In the Request of the Government of
Czechoslovakia for a decision under Article XXIII as to whether or not
the Government of the United States of America has failed to carry out
its obligations under the Agreement through its administration of the
issue of export licences, the United Kingdom representative asserted
191. NAFTA, supra note 13.
192. The General Agreement On Tariffs and Trade, Jan. 1, 1949, art. XXI (Article
XXI states: "Nothing in this Agreement shall be construed (a) to require any contracting
party to furnish any information the disclosure of which it considers contrary to its
essential security interests; or (b) to prevent any contracting party from taking any
action which it considers necessary for the protection of its essential security interests
(i) relating to fissionable materials or the materials from which they are derived; (ii)
relating to the traffic in arms, ammunition and implements of war and to such traffic in
other goods and materials as is carried on directly or indirectly for the purpose of
supplying a military establishment; (iii) taken in time of war or other emergency in
international relations; or to prevent any contracting party from taking any action in
pursuance of its obligations under the United Nations Charter for the maintenance of
international peace and security.").
193. See Summary Record of the Twenty-Second Meeting, WTO, CP.3/SR2-11/28
(June 8, 1949).
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that the ban would be justified since states would have the final say on
issues relating to their own security.194 However, this representative
also pointed out that states should be prudent not to take measures
undermining the General Agreement.195 In the end, the contracting
parties rejected Czechoslovakia's claim.196 Therefore, the contracting
parties considered their formal jurisdiction with regard to a defense
made under Article XXI.197
The United States also invoked Article XXI of the GATT in
relation to a claim by Nicaragua that an executive order issued by
President Reagan prohibiting all trade with Nicaragua violated the
United States' obligations under the GATT.1 9 8 Due to the limitation of
terms of reference, the panel could not consider the validity of the
invocation of Article XXI(b)(iii) by the United States.1 9 9 However, it
raised more general questions:
If it were accepted that the interpretation of article XXI was reserved entirely to
the Contracting Parties invoking it, how could the Contracting Parties ensure
that this general exception to all obligations under the General Agreement is not
invoked excessively or for purposes other than those set out in this provision? If
the Contracting Parties give a panel the task of examining a case involving an
article XXI invocation without authorizing it to examine the justification of that
invocation, do they limit the adversely affected Contracting Party's right to have
its complaint investigated in accordance with article XXIII:2?
2 00
Recently, Article XXI of the GATT has been examined by a WTO
panel in a dispute between Russia and Ukraine. 201 The report
concluded that the WTO possesses "jurisdiction to determine whether
the requirements of Article XXI(b)(iii) of the GATT 1994 are
satisfied."202 Accordingly, the panel held that it could review whether
(1) the member invoking the exception has sufficiently articulated its
essential security interests,2 0 3 and (2) the measures implemented are
plausibly related to the protection of such interests.20
4 But this ruling
can still be appealed to the WTO's Appellate Body with nonbinding
194. Id. at 7.
195. Id.
196. Id.
197. See Stefan Ohloff & Hannes L. Schloemann, "Constitutionalization" and
Dispute Settlement in the WTO: National Security as an Issue of Competence, 93 AM. J.
INT'L L. 424, 432 (1999); Susan Rose-Ackerman & Benjamin Billa, Treaties and National
Security, 40 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 437, 455 (2007).
198. Panel Report, United States-Trade Measures Affecting Nicaragua, T 1.2,
WTO Doc. IL6053 (adopted Oct. 13, 1986).
199. Id. at ¶ 5.13.
200. Id. at ¶ 5.17.
201. Panel Report, Russia-Measures Concerning Traffic in Transit, ¶ 3.2, 7.4,
WTO Doc. WT/DS512/R (adopted Apr. 5, 2019).
202. Id. at 1 7.104.
203. Id. at ¶ 7.134.
204. Id. at T 7.138.
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effect. Thus, it could be inferred that measures taken under Article XXI
of the GATT are subjected to review by tribunals.
Furthermore, NAFTA provisions support the review of self-
judging clauses under "good faith." NAFTA has a significant chapter
on international investment. Article 2102 contains an explicit essential
security exception.205 Article 2102 also governs the extent to which a
government may take action that would otherwise be inconsistent with
the NAFTA in order to protect its essential security interests.206 This
article does not apply to energy trade between the United States and
Canada or to measures related to government procurement.207 Article
607 and 1018, respectively, establish specialized national security
exceptions in those areas.208
According to the Statement of Administrative Action in the United
States' NAFTA Implementation Act of 1993, this exception is self-
judging; however, it must be invoked with good faith:
Article 2102 governs the extent to which a government may take action that
would otherwise be inconsistent with the NAFTA in order to protect its national
security interests ... The national security exception is self-judging in nature,
although each government would expect the provisions to be applied by the other
in good faith.2 0 9
Chapter 11 of NAFTA, dealing with investment, implies that
Article 2102 is not entirely self-judging.21 0 Article 1138 states that a
decision about whether to permit or reject an investment on the basis
of Article 2102 is not subject to the dispute settlement provisions of
NAFTA. 211 However, there is no general exclusion from dispute
205. NAFTA, supra note 13, at art. 2102. ("Subject to Articles 607 (Energy-
National Security Measures) and 1018 (Government Procurement Exceptions), nothing
in this Agreement shall be construed:
(a) to require any Party to furnish or allow access to any information the disclosure
of which it determines to be contrary to its essential security interests;
(b) to prevent any Party from taking any actions that it considers necessary for the
protection of its essential security interests (i) relating to the traffic in arms, ammunition
and implements of war and to such traffic and transactions in other goods, materials,
services and technology undertaken directly or indirectly for the purpose of supplying a
military or other security establishment, (ii) taken in time of war or other emergency in
international relations, or (iii) relating to the implementation of national policies or
international agreements respecting the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons or other
nuclear explosive devices; or
(c) to prevent any Party from taking action in pursuance of its obligations under the




209. Line Item Veto Act, 2 U.S.C. § 691 (2000).
210. NAFTA, supra note 13.
211. Id. at art. 1138 (1. Without prejudice to the applicability or non-applicability
of the dispute settlement provisions of this Section or of Chapter Twenty (Institutional
Arrangements and Dispute Settlement Procedures) to other actions taken by a Party
pursuant to Article 2102 (National Security), a decision by a Party to prohibit or restrict
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settlement for Article 2102.212 Even though there is no case law on this
point, one commentary argues that "if the Parties had agreed that
Article 2102 were entirely self-judging, Article 1138 would not be
necessary."213
In sum, until now there has not been a specific case dealing with
explicit self-judging essential security clauses in IIAs. Even though the
explicit self-judging essential security clause appears to empower the
state parties as the sole arbiter of the scope and application of their
own essential security measures, the relevant WTO cases and NAFTA
clauses support the review of self-judging clauses under a "good faith"
standard.
2. The "Good Faith" Standard
Good faith is a general principle of international law that aims "to
blunt the excessively sharp consequences sovereignty and its
surrogates may have on the international society, in ever-increasing
need of cooperation."21 4 In the context of treaties, the principle of good
faith protects the object and purpose of the treaty against acts
intending or having the effect of depriving it of its use.
2 15 Good faith is
closely connected to the customary law principle of pacta sunt
servanda216 and is mentioned not only in Article 26 of the VCLT,
217 but
equally in Article 31(1) of VCLT as a principle guiding the
interpretation of treaties.2 18
Susan Rose-Ackerman has called for the good faith review of the
explicit self-judging clauses on the basis of the WTO cases and NAFTA
clauses. 219 Rose-Ackerman implies that the Decision Concerning
Article XXI of the General Agreement could provide an example for the
the acquisition of an investment in its territory by an investor of another Party, or its
investment, pursuant to that Article shall not be subject to such provisions.
2. The dispute settlement provisions of this Section and of Chapter Twenty shall
not apply to the matters referred to in Annex 1138.2).
212. Id.
213. MEG N. KINNEAR ET AL., INVESTMENT DISPUTES UNDER NAFTA: AN
ANNOTATED GUIDE TO NAFTA CHAPTER 11 1138-46 (Kluwer Law 2006).
214. See Robert Kolb, Principles as Sources of International Law (with special
reference to good faith), 53 NETH. INT'L L. REV. 1, 18 (2006).
215. Id. at 19-20.
216. See Nuclear Tests (Austl. v. Fr.), Judgment, 1974 I.C.J. 253, 268, ¶ 46 (Dec.
1974); Nuclear Tests (N.Z. v. Fr.), Judgment, 1974 I.C.J. 457, 473, 1 49 (Dec. 1974).
217. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, art. 26, May 23, 1969, No. 18232
("every treaty in force is binding upon the parties to it and must be performed by them
in good faith. . . ") [hereinafter VCLT].
218. "A treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary
meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in their context and in the light of its
object and purpose." Id. at art. 31(1). The good faith principle finds further reflection in
the Declaration on Principles of International Law concerning Friendly Relations and
Cooperation among States in Accordance with the Charter of the United Nations. G.A.
Res. 26/25 (XXV), at 1 (Oct. 24, 1970).
219. Rose-Ackerman & Billa, supra note 197, at 468.
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"good faith" review of essential security issues in international
investment law area, even though this decision is about international
trade. 220 Stephan Schill and Robyn Briese claim that self-judging
clauses do not provide the state invoking the clause with an unlimited
and nonreviewable power. 221 The tribunals retain the power to
implement a "good faith review."22 2 Akande Dapo and Williams Sope
limit good faith review to establishing the genuineness of the reasons
a state provides for the essential security measures taken.223
Schill and Briese suggest that an analogy could be drawn between
"good faith review" by international tribunals and the standard of
review applied by domestic courts in relation to discretionary decisions
taken by administrative agencies.224 Schill and Briese also assert that
an international investment tribunal could borrow the idea of "good
faith" applied in domestic administrative law. 225 International
investment tribunals should grant a wide margin of appreciation to
states when determining whether a state's measures fall under the
necessity defense. 226 Schill even asserts that investor-state
arbitration is part of the emerging global administrative law and a
"good faith" standard should be applied when interpreting essential
security clauses in IIAs.2 2 7
William W. Burke-White and Andreas von Staden acknowledge
that a "workable standard of good faith review has yet to be fully
220. GATT Secretariat, Decision Concerning Article XXIof the General Agreement,
GATT Doc. L/5426 (Nov. 30, 1982) (Considering that the exceptions envisaged in Article
XXI of the General Agreement constitute an important element for safeguarding the
rights of contracting parties when they consider that reasons of security are involved;
Noting that recourse to Article XXI could constitute, in certain circumstances, an
element of disruption and uncertainty for international trade and affect benefits
accruing to contracting parties under the General Agreement; Recognizing that in taking
action in terms of the exceptions provided in Article XXI of the General Agreement,
contracting parties should take into consideration the interests of third parties which
may be affected; That until such time as the CONTRACTING PARTIES may decide to
make a formal interpretation of Article XXI it is appropriate to set procedural guidelines
for its application; The CONTRACTING PARTIES decide that: 1. Subject to the
exception in Article XXI: a contracting parties should be informed to the fullest extent
possible of trade measures taken under Article XXI. 2. When action is taken under
Article XXI, all contracting parties affected by such action retain their full rights under
the General Agreement. 3. The Council may be requested to give further consideration
to this matter in due course.).
221. Briese & Schill, supra note 20, at 61-140.
222. Id.
223. Dapo Akande & Sope Williams-Elegbe, International Adjudication on
Essential Security Issues: What Role for the WTO?, 43 VA. J. INTL L. 365, 396 (2003).
224. Briese & Schill, supra note 20, at 125-27.
225. Id. at 136.
226. Id. at 124.
227. Benedict Kingsbury & Stephan Schill, Fair and Equitable Treatment,
Proportionality and the Emerging Global Administrative Law, N.Y.U. GLOBAL ADMIN. L.
SERIES 6 (2009).
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developed,"22 8 and that the paucity of cases on point means that
"arbitral tribunals will have to develop their own approaches to
whether the good faith requirement has been met."229 Burke-White
and von Staden further develop the specific requirements for good faith
and their underlying reasons. Drawn from the work of scholars and
international organizations,2 3 0 the "good faith" standard encompasses
two basic elements: first, whether a host state has engaged in "honest
and fair dealing"; and second, whether there is "rational basis" for the
assertion of the essential security exception.231
C. Rejection of the "Good Faith" Standard
Even though relevant international panels and noted scholars call
for review of essential security under the good faith standard, this
Article takes a dissenting view. This Article will set out the specific
reasons for the rejection of the good faith test applied by international
investment tribunals, including potential abuses by international
investment tribunals, the uncertainty and ambiguity of the "good faith"
standard, and the formal legal interpretation of self-judging clauses.
1. Risk of Abuse of the "Good Faith" Test
While the good faith test may have advantages due to its flexibility
in application, there is arguably a risk that it will not be robust enough
to give states sufficient confidence that self-judging clauses will not be
abused. First, there is a measure of unpredictability when
international investment tribunals determine whether a state has
invoked a self-judging clause in good faith. In Shum v. Peru, the
tribunal pointed out that arbitrators or judges under any system of law
are often confronted with the challenge of construing documents
negotiated to create legal obligations at a particular place and time,
but which must be given meaning at a later date and, perhaps, in a
significantly different context.2 3 2 The Shum tribunal clearly stated
228. William W. Burke-White & Andreas von Staden, Investment Protection in
Extraordinary Times: The Interpretation and Application of Non-Precluded Measures
Provisions in Bilateral Investment Treaties, 48 VA. J. INT'L L. 307, 378 (2008).
229. Id. at 378-79.
230. The first element based on the 1949 Draft Declaration on the Rights and
Duties of States included such a standard at Article 13, the 1935 Harvard Research on
the Law of Treaties. See Draft Declaration on Rights and Duties of States with
Commentaries, G.A. Res. 375 (IV), art. 13 (Dec. 6, 1949). The second element based on
United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, art. 300, 21 I.L.M. 1261 (Dec. 10,
1982) ("States Parties shall fulfill in good faith the obligations assumed under this
Convention and shall exercise the rights, jurisdiction and freedoms recognized in this
Convention in a manner which would not constitute an abuse of right.").
231. Burke-White & von Staden, supra note 228, at 379.
232. Sefior Tza Yap Shum v. Republic of Peru, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/6, Decision
on Annulment, ¶ 130 (Feb. 12, 2015).
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that one of the main tasks of an investment tribunal is to interpret
legal text in different settings. 233 However, it is doubtful that
investment tribunals can stand in states' shoes to understand states'
essential security measures in an emergency. For this reason, it is
unpredictable for the tribunals to interpret essential security clauses
due to the practical complexity of various states, especially in the
emergency context.
Furthermore, the international investment legal regime lacks
certain mechanisms to ensure correct or consistent interpretations of
IIA obligations in line with the intention of the contracting parties, in
order to control the further development of investment law by arbitral
tribunals.234 For instance, with respect to the definition of "investor,"
the regulatory basis for the definition of investor is interpreted
inconsistently. In TSA v. Argentine, the arbitral tribunal held that the
nationality of a company is determined based on the provisions of
Article 25(2)(b) of the ICSID Convention.235 However, in contrast with
TSA, in Tokios Tokelds v. Ukraine, the arbitral tribunal held that the
nationality of a company is determined not based on the provisions of
Article 25(2)(b) of the ICSID Convention but by the respective BIT.236
Moreover, if international investment tribunals possess too wide
of a discretion to review the honesty and reasonableness of states'
measures, significant restraints might be imposed on states to take
essential security measures. These restraints may conflict with states'
sovereignty on certain security issues. With the rise of sovereignty
concerns, these restraints are not what states would expect.
2. Ambiguity of "Good Faith" Standard
Rose-Ackerman suggests a good faith requirement for
international investment tribunal's review of essential security based
on the relevant WTO cases and NAFTA provisions.237 First, the report
on United States-Trade Measures affecting Nicaragua relied by Rose-
Ackerman has not been adopted. 238 Second, no other IIAs or
international investment cases support this approach. 239 The
statement on NAFTA Article 2102 particularly mentions that the self-
233. Id. at T 156.
234. See W. Michael Reisman, 'Case Specific Mandates' versus 'Systemic
Implications'` How Should Investment Tribunals Decide?: The Freshfields Arbitration
Lecture, 29 ARB. INT'L 131 (2013).
235. TSA Spectrum de Argentina S.A. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No.
ARB/05/5, Award, ¶ 162 (Dec. 19, 2008).
236. Tokel6s v. U~kr., ICSID Case No. ARB/02/18, Decision on Jurisdiction, ¶ 71
(Apr. 29, 2004).
237. Rose-Ackerman & Billa, supra note 197, at 460-71.
238. Panel Report, United States-Trade Measures Affecting Nicaragua, WTO
Doc. L/6053 (adopted Oct. 13, 1986) [hereinafter Nicaragua III.
239. Rose-Ackerman & Billa, supra note 197, at 460-71.
934 [VOL. 52:899
2019] INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENTAND NATIONAL SECURITY REVIEW 935
judging clause is under good faith review.240 Furthermore, the WTO
case Rose-Ackerman relied on is United States-Trade Measures
Affecting Nicaragua (Nicaragua II). 241 In Nicaragua II, the panel
simply proposed a question without answer; this question is not a
holding, nor even dictum.242
Last, international investment treaty arbitration "is not a
subgenre of an existing discipline. It is dramatically different from
anything previously known in the international sphere."24 3 Significant
differences exist in the structures, assumptions, and normative
commitments between international trade law and international
investment law.244 As to essential security, foreign investment can
generate essential security-related problems in the post-establishment
phase in host states.24 5 Host states can regulate foreign investment
after investment is made. 246 However, essential security issues in
international trade law appear before goods are sold into states. After
goods are sold into states, international trade law has no impact on
goods themselves.247 These structural differences between investment
and trade provide different explanations to "essential security
exceptions" between IIAs and GATT.
Burke-White and von Staden argue that these "honest and fair
dealing" and "rational basis" elements offer several advantages to an
arbitral tribunal assessing the invocation of a self-judging security
clause. 248 First, they reflect the nature of the delegation power
inherent in a self-judging security clause, namely that it is states that
delegate limited power to IIAs to resolve the potential disputes.
249
Second, they explicitly avoid a tribunal's second-guessing of
government policy choices for which ad hoc tribunals may be poorly
240. NAFTA, supra note 13, art. 2102.
241. See Nicaragua II, supra note 238.
242. Id. at ¶ 5.17 ("If it were accepted that the interpretation of Article XXI was
reserved entirely to the contracting party invoking it, how could the CONTRACTING
PARTIES ensure that this general exception to all obligations under the General
Agreement is not invoked excessively or for purposes other than those set out in this
provision? If the CONTRACTING PARTIES give a panel the task of examining a case
involving an Article XXI invocation without authorizing it to examine the justification of
that invocation, do they limit the adversely affected contracting party's right to have its
complaint investigated in accordance with Article XXIII:2?").
243. Jan Paulsson, Arbitration Without Privity, 10 ICSID REV.-FOREIGN INv. L.J.
232, 256 (1995).
244. Kurtz, supra note 6, at 757.
245. An example is that: foreign investors can suddenly withdraw their
investments from host state to cause capital outflow and result host states' economic
instability.
246. In Argentina economic crisis, Argentina government enacted Emergency Law
to regulate foreign investments after the admission of them.
247. When good are sold into states, those goods are in the hands of consumers or
suppliers. International trade law only governs the phase of importing or exporting
goods.
248. Burke-White & von Staden, supra note 228, at 379.
249. Id. at 380-81.
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positioned. 250 Instead, the tribunal must review the honesty and
rationality of the state's invocation of the self-judging essential
security clause, which investment tribunals are much better positioned
to determine. 251 Third, this standard still imposes significant
restraints on the freedom of states to take essential security measures
by reviewing the honesty and reasonableness of governmental
measures, thereby balancing investor protection with state
sovereignty.252 Although Burke-White and von Staden propose "honest
and fair dealing" and "rational basis," it is difficult to distinguish these
two elements from good faith. It is even difficult to tell the difference
between "honest and fair dealing" and "rational basis." It seems that
Burke-White and von Staden play a game of words here.
Although Schill argues that arbitral tribunals can employ the
concept of administrative law and defer to states' essential security
decisions, it is difficult to draw the clear line between "review[ing] to
establishing the genuineness of the reasons a state stated for the
essential security measures taken" and "substantive review."253 The
underlying issue here is that the tribunals cannot simply assess the
"good faith" standard unless the investment tribunals dig into the
substance of the essential security measures to evaluate these
measures. Then the tribunal might second-guess government policy
choices, which ad hoc tribunals may be poorly positioned to do.254
3. Interpretation of Self-Judging Clause
Essential security is at the core of a state's right to exist. This
obligation to provide peace and order is an essential obligation for a
state. When a state binds itself through the conclusion of a treaty, it
reserves the right to protect its essential security, even if this implies
a departure from its treaty obligations. In this Part, this Article
prepares to analyze the nature of the self-judging clause pursuant to
Article 31 of VCLT. 2 5 5
250. Id. at 381.
251. Id.
252. Id. at 378.
253. See Kingsbury & Schill, supra note 227.
254. See Gus VAN HARTEN, INVESTMENT TREATY ARBITRATION AND PUBLIC LAW
95-102 (Oxford Univ. Press 2007) (Critics of the investment regime point out that such
supranational second-guessing of members' measures to protect their "essential
security" is in fact quite unlikely under the WTO regime for a number of reasons,
including the fact that WTO dispute settlement, limited to states as claimants, is
unlikely to present such opportunities for judicial intervention); see also Alvarez &
Khamsi, supra note 22, at 383 (Many are astounded by the idea that three individuals,
two of whom are party-appointed, in a case brought by a single foreign investor, who is
not entitled even to be considered part of the greater democratic polity of a host state
such as Argentina, can question how that government chooses to respond to a serious
crisis, especially since, as the LG&E arbitrators put it, international law generally leaves
such determinations to "the State's subjective appreciation").
255. VCLT, supra note 221, at art. 31 ("General Rule of Interpretation:
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First, the plain legal text of self-judging clauses does not provide
any room for interpretation. Self-judging clauses clearly assert that a
state will consider the necessity itself, that is, "when it considers
necessary."256 Michael Reisman suggests that arbitrators should focus
on specific cases, not act as systemic developers of international
investment law.2 57 For this reason, based on the plain legal text, the
tribunals have no competence to review self-judging essential security
clauses.
In addition, by moving from non-self-judging clauses towards self-
judging clauses, states are not willing to be interfered with by
international investment tribunals with respect to their own sensitive
essential security issues. This also accounts for the increase of self-
judging clauses in recent years.25 8 States would not move to the trend
of self-judging clauses if there was no difference between the nature of
non-self-judging clauses and self-judging clauses. If the international
investment tribunals could jump into the sensitive essential security
area and review the self-judging clause, even under good faith, there
would be no meaning for the state parties to interpret particular self-
judging clauses literally.
What is more, this interpretation reflects the nature of the
delegation power inherent in self-judging security clauses, namely that
it is states that delegate limited power to IIAs or international
investment tribunals to resolve the potential disputes.
In conclusion, the potential risk of abuses by international
tribunals, the ambiguity of a "good faith" test, and the interpretation
of self-judging clauses pursuant to Article 31 of VCLT all account for
the rejection of the "good faith" standard to review the essential
security self-judging clauses.
1. A treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary
meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in their context and in the light of its
object and purpose.
2. The context for the purpose of the interpretation of a treaty shall comprise, in
addition to the text, including its preamble and annexes: (a) Any agreement relating to
the treaty which was made between all the parties in connection with the conclusion of
the treaty; (b) Any instrument which was made by one or more parties in connection with
the conclusion of the treaty and accepted by the other parties as an instrument related
to the treaty.
3. There shall be taken into account, together with the context: (a) Any subsequent
agreement between the parties regarding the interpretation of the treaty or the
application of its provisions; (b) Any subsequent practice in the application of the treaty
which establishes the agreement of the parties regarding its interpretation; (c) Any
relevant rules of international law applicable in the relations between the parties.
4. A special meaning shall be given to a term if it is established that the parties so
intended.").
256. See id. (emphasis added).
257. Reisman & Vinnik, supra note 7.
258. See supra Part II.B.
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V. ALTERNATIVE OPTION FOR NATIONAL SECURITY REVIEW IN THE
INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LEGAL REGIME
What would happen if international investment tribunals
asserted that the "essential security" exception applies as a defense,
even under the aforementioned "reasonable available" approach to
review non-self-judging essential security? Without a "good faith"
review by international investment tribunals, how can states' misuse
of "essential security," because of the discretionary nature of invoking
essential security as a ground for restricting foreign investment, be
prevented? This Part proposes that compensation should be paid for
expropriation out of essential security measures. This compensation
option internalizes states' cost to make states more prudent when
adopting essential security measures. Correspondently, this
compensation option promotes states' political efficiency.
A. International Tribunals' Calling for Compensation
The damage caused by expropriation or similar measures shall be
compensated if these measures are nondiscriminatory, in due process,
and for an objective related to the public interest.2 59 An international
investment tribunal can defer to a state to claim necessity out of good
faith,260 but require that just compensation be paid for the damage
resulting from essential-security-related measures. This approach is
recognized by the ILC Articles on State Responsibility.261 Article 27
provides in pertinent part: "The invocation of a circumstance
precluding wrongfulness [such as necessity] in accordance with this
chapter is without prejudice to . . . (b) The question of compensation for
any material loss caused by the act in question."262 The compensation
can be deferred until the state claiming necessity has recovered from
the emergency situation sufficiently to be in a position to compensate
without impairing its essential interests.26 3
Furthermore, regarding the Argentina economic crisis, the CMS,
Enron, and Sempra tribunals all indicated that they would still have
required Argentina to compensate the claimants, even if they had
accepted Argentina's defense.2 64 In CMS, the tribunal supported the
259. Rosalyn Higgins, The Taking of Property by the State: Recent Developments in
International Law, 259 RECUEIL DES CouRs 267, 331 (1982).
260. See U.S.-Argentina BIT, supra note 18.
261. Report, Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally
Wrongful Acts, International Law Commission A/56/10 (2001).
262. Id. at art. 27
263. Alan Sykes, Economic "Necessity" in International Law, 109 AM. J. INTL L.
296, 320 (2015); see also Alvarez & Khamsi, supra note 22, at 459.
264. CMS Award, supra note 133, at TT 383-93; Enron Award, supra note 144, at
¶ 345; Sempra Award, supra note 146, at ¶ 394; see also Alvarez & Khamsi, supra note
22, at 455-60.
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approach of compensation for measures out of necessity by citing the
following cases: Gabikovo-Nagymaros, 265 Compagnie Gindrale de
l'Orinocco, 266 Properties of the Bulgar Greece, 267 and Orr &
Laubenheimer.268 In Enron and Sempra, the tribunals pointed out that
the matter of whether compensation should be paid should be agreed
to by the affected parties, and the possibility of compensation for past
events was not excluded.
269
In the Annulment Committee in Mitchell v. Democratic Republic
of the Congo, the tribunal stated that even if the tribunal had agreed
that the measures undertaken were not wrong, it would not rule out
the need for compensation.
270 In BG Group v. Argentina, the tribunal
stated that a state was "entitled to adopt such measures as it deems
appropriate to emerge from the state of emergency. However, it
remains obligated to pay compensation."
2 7 '
Therefore, it can be concluded that the compensation approach to
the damages caused by essential security measures is not only
recognized under customary international law but also supported by
some international investment tribunals.
B. The Advantages of Compensation Standard
International investment tribunals can plausibly observe and
verify the existence of necessity, but they are not in a proper position
to assess whether abrogation of international obligations is a
"reasonable available" option or the "only way" to address essential
security concerns.272 Likewise, where a state has contributed to the
underlying necessity through imprudent policy choices, excusing
obligations can encourage states to behave more imprudently.
2 7 3 To
resolve this problem, the compensation option can force a state that
deviates from its international obligations to internalize substantial
costs, to eliminate the moral hazard problem, and to promote political
efficiency.
265. Gabcikovo-Nagymaro Project, Judgment, 1997 I.C.J. Rep. 11 152-53 (Sept.
25) (where the Court noted that "Hungary expressly acknowledged that, in any event,
such a state of necessity would not exempt it from its duty to compensate its partner.").
266. United Nations, Company General of the Orinoco Case, 10 REP. OF INT'L
ARBITRAL AWARDS 184-285 (1905).
267. Report of the International Law Commission to the General Assembly, U.N.
GAOR, 32d Sess., at 38, U.N. Doc. A/35/10 (1980), reprinted in 2 Y.B. Int'l L. Comm'n 38,
1 13, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/1980/Add.l (1981).
268. U.N. Report, Claims of Orr and Laubenheimer and the Post-Glover Electric
Co., Vol. XV Vol. 37, 40 (1900).
269. Crawford, supra note 154, at 190.
270. Patrick Mitchell v. Democratic Republic of the Congo, ICSID Case No.
ARB/99/7, Decision on Application of Annulment, 1 57 (Nov. 1, 2016).
271. BG Group Plc. v. Argentine Republic, UNCITRAL, Final Award, 1 409 (Dec.
24, 2007) [hereinafter BG Group].
272. Alvarez & Khamsi, supra note 22, at 383.
273. Sykes, supra note 263, at 319.
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States will take risks that imperil them to an excessive degree if
they can impose costs on others, although sometimes "what is saved is
more valuable than what is lost.""27 State parties would be incentivized
to make a proper choice if there was a requirement that the defendant
who acts out of essential security concerns must pay compensation. 275
This mechanism eliminates the inefficiencies that would arise if a state
could conduct expropriation without paying just compensation. The
compensation requirement leads state parties to calculate the costs
and benefits of each decision. It encourages state parties to select the
least expensive way to protect their interests.
Furthermore, the cost internalization that is brought about by a
compensation requirement may be expected to incentivize politically
efficient policy choices. In the international trade arena, internalizing
the cost that trade barriers bring to foreign states results in politically
efficient trade agreements.276 "Politically efficient choices can have
normative appeal." 277 As loyal agents of the public, government
officials would make choices to reflect peoples' concerns to produce
democratic legitimacy.
Furthermore, a compensation model leaves states' sovereign right
regarding national security untouched. On one hand, international
investors have always been concerned with potential expropriation by
host states.2 7 8 On the other hand, countries need to attract foreign
investment to develop their economy. This tension between
safeguarding national security and attracting foreign investments is
featured in international investment law. The compensation model
enhances legal certainty by providing states a practical option while
respecting states' sovereign right. In Sempra, the leading international
investment legal expert Michael Reisman opined that
of course governments in these circumstances must take measures to restore
public order, but from the investment law standpoint-and this is for the future
of all investments-international investment law says you may do it, but you
must pay compensation. If exceptions are made for like these or other
circumstances, the entire purpose of modern investment law, which is to
accelerate the movement of private funds into developing countries for
development purposes, will be frustrated.2 7 9
274. Id. at 299.
275. This principle emerges from noted torts case Vincent et al. v. Lake Erie
Transp. Co., 124 N.W. 221, 221 (Minn. 1910) (holding that a boat owner who saves his
boat from the storm by tying up to the plaintiffs dock must pay for the damage to the
dock).
276. Sykes, supra note 263, at 322.
277. Id.
278. See Andrew T. Guzman, Why LDCs Sign Treaties That Hurt Them:
Explaining the Popularity of Bilateral Investment Treaties, 38 VA. J. INT'L L. 639, 664-
66, 680-81 (1998).
279. Sempra Award, supra note 146, at T 396.
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In BG Group Plc. v. The Republic of Argentina, the tribunal asserted
that the compensation mechanism met the purpose of international
investment-inducing foreign investment.
28 0
The approach of compensation is very feasible and practical. In a
scenario that an IIA covers in the pre-establishment phase, the
compensation will be zero in most cases if investors' investment is
denied for security reasons in the pre-establishment phase. The
underlying reason is that investors actually have not forged
investment in host states, therefore the damage suffered by investors
in this scenario is zero. In the post-establishment phase, if host states
annul foreign investments out of security reasons, host states need to
pay compensation that has been approved by host states in the first
stage, the pre-establishment phase.
The most important attribute is that the approach of
compensation preserves the rule-based international investment legal
regime. If an international tribunal decides to review the national
security rationale provided by the respondent, many states will find it
a highly possible intrusion into their sovereignty. On the other hand,
if an international tribunal decides that the national security exception
is nonjusticiable, it will provide states discretion to impose measures
on national security grounds and thereby shield them from investment
challenges. The compensation proposal addresses and solves these
aforementioned concerns-it allows states to address their concern and
thereby reinforces the rules-based international investment legal
regime without burdening international investment tribunals with
legal questions for which they are not in a proper position to adjudicate.
The "police power" doctrine may counter the alternative
compensation proposal here. A state's police power is the "inherent
power of a government to exercise reasonable control over persons and
property within its jurisdiction in the interest of the general security,
health, safety, morals, and welfare except where legally prohibited."s
2 8
A state is not responsible for loss of property or for other economic
disadvantages resulting from states' nondiscriminatory police
power.282 Two approaches emerge for the doctrine of police power. One
is a radical approach, that is, any nondiscriminatory measure, with
due process and for public purpose, is deemed proper.
283 In TeCmed v.
Mexico, the tribunal pointed out that states exercising their sovereign
powers, causing economic damage to investors, have no obligation to
280. BG Group, supra note 271, at T 409.
281. Police Power, MERRIAM-WEBSTER'S DICTIONARY (2019).
282. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES §
712 (Am. Law Inst. 1987).
283. See Methanex Corp., supra note 181, at 1 7. As an exception to this approach,
the Tribunal recognizes that such a regulation can be deemed expropriatory and
compensable in case "specific commitments had been given by the regulating government
to the then putative foreign investor contemplating investment that the government
would refrain from such regulation." Id.
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compensate these investors.284 However, the tribunal in Pope & Talbot
v. Canada opined that the radical approach of the police power doctrine
creates a "gaping loophole in international protections against
expropriation."285 The other approach is more nuanced. It states that
besides the aforementioned requirements, the police power should also
be proportional to the public interest and to the protection legally
granted to investments.286 But both approaches of the police power
doctrine have not answered the critical issue here-when and whether
a state can invoke this doctrine to justify its use of police power.
Another argument against this alternative compensation model is
that making certain of compensation for foreign investors would seduce
them to overinvest in host states at any risk. International investors
should conduct due diligence, expecting and factoring national security
risk into their ex ante risk assessment model and diversification
strategy. However, when planning to invest in host states, foreign
investors usually seek approval from a national security committee.287
If their investment does not get approval from a host state's national
security committee, the amount of compensation to these foreign
investments would be zero in most cases. If their investment plan gets
approval, investors would invest in host states. If states later claim
national security grounds to annul foreign investors' investments,
these investors can hardly expect this risk of national security claimed
by states.
C. The Calculation of Compensation
1. The Distinction between Lawful Expropriation and Unlawful
Expropriation
The distinction between lawful and unlawful expropriations has
not caused attention in international investment law. Expropriation of
property often amounts to its physical destruction or at least the
destruction of its value. However, the destruction of the property or its
value is not necessarily the consequence of every expropriation. In ADC
v. Hungary, the Hungarian government had directly expropriated the
claimant's contractual rights to operate two terminals of the Budapest
airport.2 88 But the new owners, after the privatization of the airport,
could operate the airport with notable commercial success. 289 As a
284. T6cnicas Medioambientales Tecmed S.A. v. United Mexican States, ICSID
Case No. ARB (AF)/00/2, Award, 1 119 (May 29, 2003).
285. Pope & Talbot Inc., supra note 182.
286. El Paso Energy Int'l Co. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/15,
Award, 1 243 (Oct. 31, 2011).
287. See supra Part III.A.
288. ADC Affiliate Ltd. v. Republic of Hung., ICSID Case No. ARB/03/16, Award,
¶¶ 210-18 (Oct. 2, 2006).
289. Id. at T 496.
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result, the value of the investment increased considerably after the
date of the expropriation. The ADC tribunal found that this
expropriation was unlawful because it violated the principle of due
process and its nature was discriminatory.290 The tribunal opined that
the standard for lawful expropriations should not be applied in such a
case.291
Besides bilateral and multilateral treaties, members of the World
Bank may apply the World Bank Guidelines on the Treatment of
Foreign Direct Investment (World Bank Guidelines) to private foreign
investment in their respective territories.292 World Bank Guidelines
Part IV deals with expropriation. 293 It prohibits expropriation or
measures having similar effects except when this is done in due
process, out of good faith, and without discrimination. 294
Compensation is deemed appropriate if the compensation is "adequate,
effective and prompt."2 9 5 Compensation is deemed adequate "if it is
based on the fair market value of the taken asset as such value is
determined immediately before the time at which the taking occurred
or the decision to take the asset became publicly known."
296
International investment law allows states to take property by
way of expropriation. The Chorzow Factory Case made a distinction
between lawful expropriation and unlawful expropriation. 297 The
Iran-United States Claims Tribunal in the Amoco case confirmed that
the level of compensation depended on the legal qualification of the
expropriation.2 9 8 The cases Santa Elena,2 99 Goetz v. Burundi,
3 00 and
Mondev v. United States of America301 adopted the same approach.
Lawful expropriation requires the following elements: (a) the
expropriation is for a public purpose; (b) it is made according to due
process of law; (c) on a nondiscriminatory basis; and (d) against
prompt, adequate, and effective compensation. An expropriation only
wanting fair compensation is considered to be a provisionally lawful
expropriation, precisely because the tribunal dealing with the case will
290. Id. at ¶ 476.
291. Id. at¶ 481.
292. Guidelines on the Treatment of Foreign Direct Investment, in 2 LEGAL
FRAMEWORK FOR THE TREATMENT OF FOREIGN INVESTMENT 33 (World Bank, 1992)
[hereinafter World Bank Guidelines].
293. Id. at IV.
294. Id. at IV.1.
295. Id. at IV.2.
296. Id. at IV.3.
297. The Factory at Chorzow (Ger. v. Pol.), Judgment, 1928 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No.
17, at 190 (Sept. 13) [hereinafter Chorzow].
298. Amoco Int'l Fin. Corp. v. Iran, 15 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. 189, 1222-24 (1987).
299. Compafiia del Desarrollo de Santa Elena S.A. v. Republic of Costa Rica, ICSID
Case No. ARB/96/1, Final Award, T 1 (Feb. 17, 2000) [hereinafter Santa Elena].
300. Antoine Goetz et consorts v. R6publique du Burundi, ICSID Case No.
ARB/95/3, Award, ¶ 1 (Feb. 10, 1999).
301. Mondev International Ltd. v. U.S., ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/99/2, Award, ¶
1 (Oct. 11, 2002).
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determine and award such compensation. 302 The World Bank
Guidelines reinforce the notion that an expropriation only wanting fair
compensation is lawful. 303 Irmgard Marboe, a professor of
international law at the Law Faculty of the University of Vienna,
asserts that the mere existence of a dispute about the amount of
compensation does not render the expropriation unlawful.304
2. Standard of Compensation
With respect to lawful expropriation, the compensation standard
is generally the standard of fair market value.30 5 The World Bank
Guidelines prescribe "the fair market value of the taken asset as such
value is determined immediately before the time at which the taking
occurred." 306 The Venezuela Holdings 307 and Tidewater tribunals
determined that the expropriation was lawful and that compensation
should therefore be based on the market value of the investment at the
point immediately prior to the expropriation.3 0 8 The CMS, Enron, and
Sempra tribunals based the fair market value on the discounted cash
flow (DCF) method.3 09 The three tribunals also decided that the loss to
be compensated was the difference between the fair market value of
claimants' shareholdings, assuming Argentina had not taken its
offending measures, compared to their value after the offending
measures.3 10
With respect to unlawful expropriation, it is common for tribunals
to be guided by the compensation principle established in the Chorzow
Factory case that "reparation must, as far as possible, wipe out all the
consequences of the illegal act and re-establish the situation which
would, in all probability, have existed if that act had not been
committed." 31 The CMS, Enron, Sempra, and LG&E tribunals all
confirmed that the applicable standard for reparation was set out in
the Chorzow Factory Case and codified at Article 31 of the ILC Articles,
302. Tidewater Inc., Tidewater Inv. SRL, Tidewater Caribe, C.A., et al. v.
Bolivarian Republic of Venez., ICSID Case No. ARB/10/5, Award, ¶ 146 (Mar. 13, 2015)
[hereinafter Tidewater]; Conoco Phillips Petrozuata B.V., et al. v. Bolivarian Republic of
Venezuela, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/30, Decision on Jurisdiction, ¶ 394 (Sept. 3, 2013).
303. World Bank Guidelines, supra note 292, at IV.
304. See generally IRMGARD MARBOE, CALCULATION OF COMPENSATION AND
DAMAGES IN INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAw (2009); see also RIPINSKY & WILLIAMS,
DAMAGES IN INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAw 68-69 (Brit. Inst. of Intl and Comp. L.
2008).
305. Id. at 730.
306. World Bank Guidelines, supra note 292, at IV.3.
307. Venez. Holdings, B.V. et al. v. Bolivarian Republic of Venez., ICSID Case No.
ARB/07/27, Award, art. 6 (May 12, 2005).
308. Tidewater, supra note 302, at ¶¶ 151-52.
309. CMS Award, supra note 133, at TT 411, 416, 421; Enron Award, supra note
144, at ¶ 385; Sempra Award, supra note 146, at T 416.
310. Id.
311. Chorzow, supra note 297, at ¶ 47.
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namely that compensation must "wipe out the consequences" of the
illegal act and, therefore, the standard of compensation is measured by
the "loss suffered."3 12 The LG&E tribunal pointed out, however, that
the measure of damages for wrongful acts should be different from that
for compensation for lawful expropriation.
31 3 The tribunal indicated
that the appropriate measure of damage was the "actual loss" incurred
by the investors "as a result" of Argentina's wrongful acts, and
determined that this damage could be measured by the loss of
dividends.314
When adopting nondiscriminatory and nonarbitrary essential
security measures out of necessity, states' measures would satisfy the
lawful expropriation requirements since these measures are for the
public purpose of protecting essential security. Thus, one way of
valuing compensation for lawful expropriation out of essential security
is to calculate the undertaking at the moment of dispossession. The
DCF method could be applied to calculate the fair market value of this
undertaking.
VI. CONCLUSION
This Article systematically explores whether domestic courts or
international tribunals can examine the process of national security
review over prospective foreign investment. The answer for this issue
depends on two factors. The first factor is whether states enjoy IIA
treaty protection; the second factor is whether this treaty protection
covers the pre-establishment phase or the post-establishment phase or
both. This Article focuses exclusively on essential security measures,
out of necessity in two phases of international investment, the pre-
establishment phase and the post-establishment phase.
Faced with the increasing concern over national sovereignty and
the uncertainty of IIAs' role in promoting economic development, states
adopt two mechanisms to protect their sovereignty-the national
security review regime, and the adoption of security related exception
clauses in HAs. Upon analyzing national security review regimes in
the United States, China, United Kingdom, Canada, and Russia,
including the composition of national security review committees and
factors considered by national security review committees, this Article
concludes that many states are trying to build a CFIUS-style national
security review mechanism. Moreover, states have moved from non-
self-judging security clauses to adopting self-judging essential security
312. CMS Award, supra note 133, at 1 400; Enron Award, supra note 144, at ¶ 359;
Sempra Award, supra note 146, at 1 400; LG&E Award, supra note 141, at 1 31.
313. LG&E Award, supra note 141, at ¶ 38.
314. Id. at T 45.
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clauses in order to protect their regulatory sovereignty and security
interests.
In the absence of an international investment treaty, investors
cannot enjoy IIA's protection. Any state could deny the admission of
the investment or nationalize the property with compensation in
accordance with its domestic law and the international minimum
standard of treatment.
Within an international investment treaty framework, regarding
the non-self-judging context, states could review the substance of
essential security measures. This Article analyzes the relevant
international investment law cases-CMS v. Argentina,3 1 5 LG&E v.
Argentina, 316 Enron v. Argentina, 317 Sempra v. Argentina 318 and
Continental Casualty v. Argentina, 319 and it asserts that the
investment tribunals have the competence to review non-self-judging
essential security clauses. The "only way" test embedded in Article 25
of the ILC's Articles on State Responsibility and the "reasonable
available" test developed by the Continental Casualty tribunal provide
good reference to the standard of review by the investment tribunals.
This Article asserts that the "reasonable available" approach is a better
approach than the "only way" approach in reviewing non-self-judging
essential security clauses because of the origin of non-self-judging
essential security clauses, the differences of treaty and customary
international law defenses on necessity, and the interlocking nature of
international trade and investment.
For self-judging essential security clauses, building on the
analysis of the pertinent GATT Article XXI cases, including
Czechoslovakia v. United States in 1949, Nicaragua v. United States in
1984 (Nicaragua 1), 320 Nicaragua v. United States in 1985-86
(Nicaragua ll), 321 and the most relevant NAFTA provisions on
security, this Article concludes that the investment tribunals tend to
review the essential security issue in the self-judging clause under the
"good faith" standard. Some distinguished scholars also argue for "good
faith" review of self-judging clauses. Some scholars further provide the
specific tests for "good faith" review. However, this Article takes a
dissenting approach, arguing that international investment tribunals
should not go through "good faith" review due to the ambiguity of this
concept, potential abuses by tribunals, and the interpretation pursuant
to VCLT 31. Instead, this Article proposes that states should pay
compensation for the damage caused by essential security measures.
315. CMS Award, supra note 133, at 1 1.
316. LG&E Decision on Liability, supra note 29, at ¶ 1.
317. Enron Award, supra note 144.
318. Sempra Award, supra note 146.
319. Continental Casualty Award, supra note 147.
320. Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v.
U.S.), Decision on Jurisdiction and Admissibility, 1984 I.C.J. Rep. 392 (Nov. 26).
321. Id. at 14.
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The feasible and practical compensation requirement could avoid
moral hazard, improve political efficiency, keep states' options of
adopting security-related measures open, and preserve the rule-based
international investment legal regime.
With respect to compensation, there is a distinction between
lawful expropriation and unlawful expropriation, which leads to
different standards of compensation. When adopting
nondiscriminatory and nonarbitrary essential security measures out of
necessity, states' measures generally would fall under lawful
expropriation. Lawful compensation generally adopts the standard of
fair market value based on the DCF method.
The international investment legal regime is going through a
phase of reorientation. With the rise of essential security self-judging
clauses as well as the increasing number of IIAs, it is foreseeable that
there will be some dispute about essential security clauses in the
future. The issue of how to balance essential security interests and
foreign investors' interests in the international investment legal
regime has not been comprehensively resolved until now. This Article
provides a novel and plausible path for dealing with essential security
issues involving foreign investment.

